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"Ah yes," sighed a visiting Frenchman late Sunday.
"Detroit. I like it. Wonderful architecture. All this glass. But
then, . . . the rest, it's like Pakistan."'
INTRODUCTION
After four decades of Detroit's efforts to revitalize itself
through government-sponsored redevelopment, the quotation
above is a fitting epitaph for a failed experiment. Government-
sponsored redevelopment efforts also have failed in most other
cities across the nation. For example, even with Baltimore's
vaunted harbor and downtown redevelopment program, the city
"neighborhoods continue to deteriorate, city dwellers have been
unable to secure quality employment, and city space has been
increasingly restructured to meet the various interests of
developers, tourists, and upper-income consumers."2 Likewise,
Los Angeles has created a glistening downtown worthy of the
opening credits of the now-defunct television program, L.A.
Law, while "South-Central has gotten very little good and a
whole lot bad from [Los Angeles Community Redevelopment
Agency] policies and priorities."3 The presence of new stadiums,
convention centers, retail centers, and office towers created by
federal and later local redevelopment efforts have been abject
failures in revitalizing the economies of metropolitan central
cities.4 They have not arrested blight; they have not refilled the
1. Catherine S. Manegold,A Meeting Fit for Detroit's Contrasts, N.Y TIMES, Mar.
16, 1994, at D2. This quotation is submitted as an example only. No slur is intended
on the residents or governments of either Detroit or Pakistan.
2. Marc V. Levine, Downtown Redevelopment As an Urban Growth Strategy: A
Critical Appraisal of the Baltimore Renaissance, 9 J. URB. AFF. 103, 115 (1987).
3. Fred Seavey et al., Reflections from the Field: Redevelopment's Role in the L.A.
Uprising, REDEVELOPMENT ADvoc., Summer 1992, at 1,3 (excerpting a 1990 Los Angeles
Times editorial by Mark Ridley-Thomas). The initial opinion piece, written by now
City Councilman Mark Ridley-Thomas, was published on January 29, 1990, over two
years before the civil disturbances in Los Angeles. Mark Ridley-Thomas, It's Easy to
be Overlooked When You're Not Even Included in the Picture, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1990, at B5.
Unfortunately it is likely that this type of office tower and retail arcade develop-
ment created in Los Angeles would have occurred with or without redevelopment
because market conditions supported those projects. The Embarcadero Center in San
Francisco is another example of such development.
4. To a certain extent, describing these efforts as failures is a harsh judgment.
Very often individual projects did succeed on their own terms. Unfortunately, the
goals of these projects had little to do with improving the quality of life for residents
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city's coffers; they have not revitalized the local economy; and
above all they have not improved the life chances of inner-city
residents.
There are two explanations for this failure. First, the projects
that were carried out had little, if anything, to do with improv-
ing the economic opportunities of the local poor. Rather,
redevelopment under the auspices of both federal and local
jurisdictions pursued "downtown -development."' As will be
shown below, this is a flawed development approach. The
second explanation for redevelopment's failures flows directly
from the first. The local and federal redevelopment effortswere
generated, planned, and implemented by local elites.6 As might
be expected, local elites produced projects that they perceived
to be important. Unfortunately, these projects did not benefit
the city as a whole and particularly did not benefit low-income
residents of the city. Because the planning process was not
open, and above all because the residents of project areas that
were to be redeveloped did not participate in the redevel-
opment that took place, the redevelopment effort pursued goals
that could not be expected to revitalize the city. The low-
income residents of project areas were not the clientele that
this entrepreneurial offshoot of government served In many
ways, the story of redevelopment in the United States is the
story of local political elites ignoring the needs of low-income
residents and pursuing development policies that had little
likelihood of benefitting the broader city. In this way, rede-
velopment has been a contributing factor in the decline of
major American cities.
Although to date these policies have failed to revitalize inner
cities,' redevelopment powers are some of the few arrows left
in the quiver of cities which must fend off economic decline.
in these or other cities. Thus, simply because downtown redevelopment did not
revitalize the rest of the city-make it more pleasant, more livable, or more prosper-
ous-does not necessarily indicate that the programs did not function as they were
supposed to. That fact, however, is part of the problem.
5. "Downtown development" does not have a stable definition, yet it is obvious
when one sees it: convention centers, office towers, luxury hotels, festival shopping
plazas, stadiums, and the like. One unifying characteristic is that downtown devel-
opment is devoid of any obvious connection to the lives and livelihood of the majority
of city residents. Throughout this Article the phrase "downtown development" shall
be used to note this form of redevelopment.
6. See infra note 18 for the definition of "elites" as used in this Article.
7. See infra Part IV for a discussion of one successful project in Boston.
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Moreover, they are exceptionally powerful tools for changing
land use and real estate development and thereby subsidizing
and locating favored forms of development. This Article argues
that a fundamental shift in redevelopment priorities and
projects must take place, and that such a shift would strength-
en redevelopment and forge it into a significant tool in the
effort to revitalize cities. Part I presents a brief discussion of
preliminary considerations that are important to any discus-
sion of redevelopment or city revitalization. Part II provides a
description and history of the transition from federally funded
redevelopment to locally funded redevelopment, and summar-
izes the general features of local redevelopment efforts as
currently practiced. Part III explores the many criticisms,
problems, failures, and disappointments of these powers as
they are practiced. Part IV sets forth suggestions for reform
based on restructuring the power and decision-making relation-
ships in urban redevelopment. Most importantly, redevelop-
ment must be planned and implemented by the residents of the
redevelopment area.
Part V further elaborates upon three likely approaches for
pursuing community-controlled redevelopment. First, the fed-
eral tax code should be revised so that tax-exempt bonds may
not be issued for redevelopment projects except under the
circumstances suggested here. Second, state enabling legisla-
tion should be altered to mandate project area resident control
of the redevelopment process. Third, community groups should
act politically to demand that the city grant them these powers
regardless of whether state or federal legislative changes are
forthcoming. Finally, Part VI outlines promising directions
resident-controlled redevelopment might pursue.
Misguided redevelopment has been both a symptom of, and
a means for achieving, inappropriate urban development goals.
Requiring resident control will improve the redevelopment
process itself, and simultaneously redirect the development
goals towards which it channels its energy. One hopes that by
shifting control of the redevelopment process, we also would
shift the goals that redevelopment would pursue and the
development forms it would take. Presumably this would result
in urban development designed to benefit residents of the
urban core.
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I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The topic of this Symposium-revitalizing America's cit-
ies-spans a breathtaking array of concerns. Any single Article
must slight critical questions in the broader concern. This
Article advocates, as one small step towards revitalization of
central urban cores, resident-controlled redevelopment. Rede-
velopment is a process focused largely on land use and real
estate development. As such, it cannot address many of the
other critical issues that must be considered to truly revitalize
urban cores. For example, redevelopment would not easily foster
entrepreneurship so as to create-rather than locate-jobs, nor
does it invest in human capital, reduce crime, or reduce
discrimination. As one step towards this broader goal, however,
reforming redevelopment could have significant impacts.
At the outset, it is important to define some terms and to
clarify motivations. This section briefly discusses the definition
of a city, power in the city context, why we should concern
ourselves with revitalizing a city in the first place, and the
meaning of the words "local" and "community" in the redevelop-
ment context. These preliminary discussions will set the stage
for the substantive inquiry into resident-controlled redevelop-
ment that follows.
A. What Is a City?
A city is a political jurisdiction defined by a geographical
area over which it exercises some governmental powers. Within
that broad definition, it is important to recognize the myriad
sizes, shapes, and characteristics of cities. Often we suffer from
a genericism of language where "the city" as a phrase is meant
to conjure up crumbling urban cores fraught with high-crime,
unemployment, disinvestment, redlining, declining sales and
property tax bases, and a crushing lack of opportunity for
disadvantaged residents. Of course, the governmental powers
historically associated with major cities have been dispersed
well beyond these cities to hundreds, indeed thousands, of
smaller suburban cities. These smaller cities, such as Indian
Wells in California-largely a walled fortress of rich suburban-
ites-possess all the powers of any other city, but so far as one
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can tell, Indian Wells does not need revitalization in any form.'
In discussions of urban decay, the juxtaposition of "suburban"
life and "city" life is commonplace. This juxtaposition is mis-
leading because most suburban dwellers live within the geo-
graphical boundaries of political jurisdictions called cities. 9
"The political autonomy of places, as well as the planning
power this entails, reproduces and exaggerates the inequalities
between places rather than leveling them. Local control and
the planning apparatus . .. becomes a Trojan Horse in the
American City."'
This observation is more than a petty concern over sloppy
discourse. Cities are arenas for political and economic compe-
tition--on both an intermural and intramural basis. Cities are
also sites of political conflict over land use and development.
This conflict takes many forms and involves many competing
interests and motivations. In addition to revenue consider-
ations, political concerns of every stripe enter into the complex
equation of redevelopment approaches and decisions. These
include everything from serving powerful interests to removing
poor residents from a jurisdiction, to pleasing wealthy resi-
dents by accommodating their entertainment preferences," to
8. There are other examples: "Cities like Palm Springs, Santa Barbara, and
Belmont have designated their most valuable and booming areas as redevelopment
zones; the city of Indian Wells, with one of the highest per capita incomes in the
world, made all land within its city limits (even wilderness) an official redevelopment
area." JOHN R LOGAN & HARVEY L MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF PLACE 174 (1987).
9. Within this fragmentation, race and income play critical roles in determining
quality of life.
[J]urisdictional fragmentation has made segregation economically and socially
functional for metropolitan businesses and residents. Firms and families intent
on reducing contact with African-Americans and other minorities, by ... actually
moving to jurisdictions where they are diminished or absent, secure several
distinct advantages .... [T]hey are often subject to lower taxes by not having
to share the costs of servicing the costly infrastructure of older business districts
or the social needs of poor minority residents .... [Tihey make themselves
eligible for local services like education and parks that are better funded....
[They] can exercise land use regulatory powers .... This means that once
middle- and high- income households manage to isolate themselves in the
sanctuary of a suburb, they have the power to resist and thwart the metropoli-
tan-wide economic and social forces that would normally make even outer
communities more economically and residentially diverse.
Peter D. Salins, Metropolitan Areas: Cities, Suburbs, and the Ties that Bind, in
INTERWOVEN DESTINIES: CITIES AND THE NATION 159,160 (Henry G. Cisneros ed., 1993)
(emphasis added).
10. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 8, at 153.
11. A particularly obnoxious rationalization for this preference is to equate
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competing with neighboring jurisdictions, to fostering political
aspirations of office holders, to maintaining the property values
of residential neighborhoods, to fostering certain types of
industrial development. In short, the development actions of
"cities"-be they suburban or central core-have important
effects far beyond their borders.
To foreshadow later arguments, given the diffused decision
making of a multiplicity of cities, the competition between
those cities, and the similar pressures cities face, city manag-
ers frequently use redevelopment to pursue development goals
that harm the poor. Though local decisions, cumulatively they
have national scale. City managers face difficult fiscal issues
and must, to a certain extent, run their city as a business.
They also act on the widespread, though debatable, belief that
"lower-income populations contribute much less to revenue
than they do to expenditures" for a local jurisdiction.' 2 Given
this basic fiscal preoccupation, identical development goals
manifest themselves in city after city: the ideal city population
contains several large sales tax generators, but no low income
population. 3 After all, "a city is, in legal terms, a municipal
corporation, and like any other corporation it will be anxious
to exchange a losing line for a profitable one." 4 These com-
bined forces create a race to the bottom which results in a
development policy that harms the urban poor.
B. Why Revitalize the City?
Of course, one must ask what is the virtue of revitalizing
the city anyway? Revitalizing the city primarily takes on
entertainment choices, from upscale shopping malls to theaters and symphony halls,
with middle-class popular tastes. This argument appropriately dismisses the post-
modern office tower and other forms of architecture as hopelessly out of touch with
the aesthetic choices of the vast majority of urban residents. Unfortunately, the
argument then proceeds to adopt a middle-class populist attitude against those elite
tastes as a justification for city funded programs which systematically harm the poor.
See BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN INC.: How AMERICA BUILDS
CITIES 208-13, 239-41 (1989).
12. Susan S. Fainstein & Norman I. Fainstein, Regime Strategies, Communal
Resistance, and Economic Forces, in RESTRUCTURING THE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 245,251 (Susan S. Fainstein et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter
RESTRUCTURING THE CITY].
13. In this way, city managers' ideal city mirrors many law professors' ideal work
situation: grants which fully fund research obviate the need for pesky students.
14. William Alonso, Cities, Planners, and Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 437, 446 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
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importance in the context of increasing the quality of life and
opportunity of central city residents. 5
There is no particular virtue in maintaining the governmen-
tal entity called Detroit. To the author, the desire to revitalize
the city stems from a desire to improve the life chances and
opportunity of the impoverished-the majority of whom live in
central urban cores.' 6 Redevelopment controlled by residents
would seek to revitalize the city by focusing on improving the
life chances and opportunities of these groups. This unremark-
able proposition is in fact quite unusual in the standard
explanation for the need to revitalize cities generally, or for the
use of redevelopment as a tool to that end. Rather, standard
justifications for revitalization only vaguely connect increased
investment with a generalized improvement in the quality of
life for city residents.
15. Commentators have suggested other justifications for preserving central
urban cores. For example, Jane Jacobs suggests that vibrant city regions are critical
to the economic life of a nation. She concludes: "Societies and civilizations in which
the cities stagnate don't develop and flourish further. They deteriorate." JANE JACOBS,
CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 232 (1984). Thus one may want to revitalize urban
cores to maintain long-term 'economic vitality. On another tack, Larry Bennett
argues that central urban cores, densely populated with diverse ages, races, and
classes of people are valuable because they provide us with a space and context for
'surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation." LARRY BENNETT, FRAGMENTS OF
CITIES: THE NEW AMERICAN DOWNTOWNS AND NEIGHBORHOODS 13 (1990). He then decries
how governmental policies have both inadvertently and purposefully promoted the
'physical restructuring of the post-World War II American city [which] has impinged
on these special virtues of cities." Id. at 13-14. Likewise, in quaintly dated language,
William Alonso describes the agglomeration benefits of dense cities:
[The central city] is the center of power, where a new enterprise may be
conceived over lunch; ... here one may find a shop that specializes in stringed
instruments or clothing for six-foot women . . . an agency that can supply the
names and addresses of a few thousand street railway enthusiasts or likely
opponents of the death penalty .... Let the size of the downtown area drop
below the necessary critical mass and dissolution will follow. There will not be
enough six-foot girls coming downtown for there to be a shop especially for
them.
Alonso, supra note 14, at 449-50.
16. William Julius Wilson notes that between 1969 and 1982 poverty increased
nationwide in terms of real numbers and as a percentage of the population, that
metropolitan areas endured the greatest growth in poverty, and that "central cities
accounted for most of the metropolitan increase in poverty." WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 172 (1987).
He writes: "Accordingly, to say that poverty has become increasingly urbanized is to
note a remarkable change in the concentration of poor people in the United States
.... " Id. (emphasis omitted). As shown below, urban redevelopment played a
significant, though little mentioned, role in fostering such concentration.
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C. Defining Community Control
Because language is fuzzy and words such as "community"
have been abused beyond pulp into liquefaction, one must
distinguish very carefully the difference between the sort of
redevelopment advocated here and redevelopment as currently
practiced. Redevelopment is frequently described as "local" and
"community driven." These, however, are deceptive terms.
Redevelopment and urban renewal were "local" in the context
of our federal system. Redevelopment today is "community
driven" when one considers the "community" to be Los Angeles,
St. Louis, Las Vegas, or Chicago. Yet, on the ground, within
the geographical areas over which redevelopment agencies
exercise their powers, standard redevelopment is not "local" or
"community driven" at all. Standard redevelopment is planned
and implemented by local elites-often at the behest of
powerful local and nonlocal entities-to achieve results that
those elites deem important. The people who live where rede-
velopment happens, the people who have the most to lose,
generally have no say in this "local" and "community driven"
process. On a good day, project area residents can block partic-
ularly egregious redevelopment proposals. On worse days, the
project area residents can gain concessions from a plan that
otherwise did not consider them or their needs. Never do
project area residents comprise the driving force behind the
creation of a plan.
Simply put, the difference between reacting to amend the
margins of a proposal that you had no part in creating, and
starting from scratch to create a plan that addresses concerns
you consider paramount, is vast. This difference makes all the
difference. The form of redevelopment advocated in this Article
will be dubbed "resident-controlled redevelopment" to indicate
control, planning, and implementation by residents of the
project area at issue. This structure would require a regularly
elected redevelopment agency board two-thirds of which is
composed of project area residents exercising full decision-
making authority and elected for that sole purpose. No other
form of redevelopment can be considered resident-controlled
regardless of how "local" or "community driven" it may be.' 7
17. Obviously, some jurisdictions attempt to pursue redevelopment that is per-
ceived by elites to be in the best interests of the residents of the project area. These
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D. Resident Power, Elite Power
"Power" in the local political context has been much debated
and discussed. 18 This Article will not enter this broad debate
except to point out that urban redevelopment-when controlled
by local residents rather than local political and economic
elites-would be likely to reduce and diffuse .the power of
elites.' 9 Resident control of redevelopment powers has the
ability to short-circuit traditional power structures in a dra-
matic fashion. By placing low-income residents in control of
significant governmental powers, the rules of the game will be
altered fundamentally and the arena in which the game is
played will have changed as well.2" Just as city-sponsored
redevelopment now functions as a national development policy,
so it is likely that a series of resident-controlled redevelopment
projects could also create a new national policy based on
serving a new client.
With these preliminary issues informing the discussion, this
Article now proceeds to discuss the history and substance of
jurisdictions should be congratulated. The existence of rare counter-examples,
however, does not deflate the argument or policy prescriptions of this Article. Those
jurisdictions that already are pursuing resident-centered redevelopment should have
no problem formally adopting the policies prescribed here. They also should welcome
the leveling of the playing field that requiring similar behavior of all jurisdictions
would bring.
18. For a general discussion of elite power, see PETER BACHRACH & MORTON S.
BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, (1970); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS? (1961); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO REALLY RULESP? NEW HAVEN AND COMMUNrrY
POWER REEXAMINED (1978); ROGER FRIEDIAND, POWER AND CRISIS IN THE CITY: CORPORA-
TIONS, UNIONS AND URBAN POLICY (1982); Clarence N. Stone, Systemic Power in
Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory, 74 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 978 (1980).
Throughout this article, "elite' will be used to refer to political leaders of a local
jurisdiction and business leaders who hope to impact the political decision-making
process.
19. This would be true whether those elites are produced as a symptom of who
governs, an indicator of who controls the systemic hierarchy, or as a product of historic
decisions made within the context of a systemic hierarchy.
20. See Patrick Dunleavy, An Issue Centered Approach to the Study of Power, 24
POL. STUD. 423, 429-30 (1976). Dunleavy presents the indisputable notion that local
government is not merely an arena over which groups attempt to exercise power, but
that this arena may itself limit decision-making possibilities and thereby systematical-
ly burden certain actors. Although couched in obscure terminology, Dunleavy shows
that the state always is implicated in the exercise of power, regardless of the
particular dispute, lack of dispute, or result in a particular case. We are well past the
naive stage at which one can assume that the state, whether through the Federal
Reserve Bank or the Supreme Court, simply sets neutral rules that govern an arena
in which we all compete equally-whether for economic or political goods.
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From Federal to Local Programs
Redevelopment began as a federally driven, but locally
implemented, program with the Housing Act of 1949.21 Though
created under the auspices of a housing act, redevelopment was
never a housing program. Housing expert Catherine Bauer ex-
plained that "the disparate alliance supporting the .1949 U.S.
Housing Act, and in particular its provisions for urban rede-
velopment, had coalesced because ' . . . different groups of
people, like the blind men feeling the elephant, made entirely
different assumptions as to the essential nature and purpose
of this legislation.' ,22 Housing advocates thought it would
result in additional affordable housing, while developers saw
it as an economic opportunity. Local jurisdictions viewed it as
a mechanism to clear eyesores and build developments that
they perceived to be important, largely on the federal dime.
From the outset, indications showed that any optimism for
additional affordable housing was misplaced. For example,
Senator Bricker of Ohio expressed his all-too-typical concerns
in response to an early proposal, "'I am in favor of the slum
elimination section. I am opposed to the public housing sec-
tion."'23 The Housing Act of 1949 contained a massive loophole
that also should have alerted housing advocates that redevelop-
ment would not serve their goals. The original legislation
required that redevelopment be practiced in a "slum area or a
deteriorated or deteriorating area which is predominantly
residential in character," yet the legislation did not require
21. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 2, 63 Stat. 413
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1460 (1988)), omitted by Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633,
652 (current version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)).
22. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 25 (citing MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA 156 (1975)).
23. Ashley A. Foard & Hilbert Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation,
in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 14, at 71, 89 (quoting
95 CONG. REC. 4852 (1949)).
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that the housing which was to be torn down be replaced.24 As
Lawrence Friedman has noted, "high-cost housing, it was
thought, eliminated blight and slum conditions just as effi-
ciently as low-cost housing, and perhaps a good deal more so.,
25
Thus, the original redevelopment legislation could not be
considered a housing construction bill. The original legislation
was predicated on the notion, apparently held in good faith,
that by destroying slum housing, government was not only
straightening out its balance sheet, but benefitting the former
residents of that housing.2"
The essential elements of federally sponsored redevelop-
ment-and the locally sponsored redevelopment which contin-
ues today-are: eminent domain in the service of site
assembly,27 property tax increment financing combined with
tax- exempt bonds to cover the local jurisdiction's share of
project cost, 28 land "write-down" of cost to private developers, 29
24. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 110, 63 Stat. 420
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1988)), omitted by Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633,652 (current
version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)). The Housing Act of 1949 was never
repealed, but Congress eliminated any grants under the provision after January 1,
1975.
25. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF
FRUSTRATION 151 (1968).
26. As noted infra Part III.C, one of the primary criticisms of redevelopment as
practiced over the years is that it has displaced the poor. Ironically, that was in fact
the original intent of redevelopment.
27. STEVEN D. MESSNER, A BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, 28
(Indiana Business Report No. 41, 1967); see infra Part II.B.3.
28. The tax increment provision could not be mandated by federal legislation but
rather was included in most state-enabling legislation. States that did not allow tax
increment utilized tax abatement policies. Wilton S. Sogg & Warren Wertheimer,
Legal and Governmental Issues in Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND
THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 14, at 126, 136-38 (citing Note, Urban Renewal, 72 HARV.
L. REV. 504 (1959)). Sogg and Wertheimer set forth the problems cities faced in trying
to finance their share of project cost. Municipal debt limitations often barred
borrowing by the city, and general obligation bonds were deemed too risky to the city's
credit rating. Thus tax increment financing was the tool of choice. Id. See infra Part
II.B.2 for a discussion of tax increment financing.
29. Under the original slum clearance notion, the governmental component of a
project's cost was the cost of the land with the existing buildings included, plus the
cost of razing those buildings and providing any necessary infrastructure to support
the subsequent development. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit.
I, § 110, 63 Stat. 420-21 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1460 (1988)), omitted by
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a),
88 Stat. 633, 652 (current version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)). Under the
Act, the agency would purchase the land, demolish the structures and augment it with
any necessary infrastructure such as new roads, curbs, gutters and sewers, and then
sell the land for its value after these efforts. "Write down" refers to the difference
between the cost of purchasing and augmenting the land, and the actual (lower) price
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and the requirement that the project area suffer from "blight." °
Throughout its history, federal redevelopment was charac-
terized by a great degree of local control, and remarkable
compliance by the federal government to local pressure. Orig-
inally, federal grants and loans covered up to two-thirds of the
governmental component of local project costs.3 Over time that
proportion grew to a maximum of three-fourths,32 while the
universe of activities that would count as the local jurisdiction's
share increased. Although the Act was renamed "Urban Renew-
al" in 1954 to suggest a greater emphasis on rehabilitation
rather than clearance, little of substance changed.3" The
program remained a system for funding development projects
demanded by the politically powerful within local jurisdictions,
and it became much more generous as well. "By 1968 the
federal government was collecting only twelve cents of every
that the developer pays for the cleared land. This practice was supported by the theory
that tax increment funds received from the new development would more than cover
the local jurisdiction's loss in subsidizing the developer's purchase. The federal govern-
ment then paid the remainder of these expenses. The difference between that amount
and the cost for the vacant land was the "write down" subsidy to the private develop-
ers. Id. However, even where the write down subsidy is zero, significant subsidies flow
from the simple exercise of government site assembly powers on behalf of the proposed
development.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949).
31. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 104, 63 Stat. 416
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1454 (1988)), omitted by Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633, 652 (current
version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)).
32. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 103, 63 Stat. 416
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1453 (1988)), omitted by Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633,652 (current
version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)). Sogg and Wertheimer generally de-
scribe the four basic forms of federal aid as: (1) capital grants for plans and research;
(2) loans to assist planning and execution; (3) insurance and purchase of mortgages;
and (4) technical assistance. Sogg & Wertheimer, supra note 28, at 129.
William Slayton, a former commissioner of the Urban Renewal Administration,
explained that "the growth and persistence of blight has its roots in the inability of
private enterprise to rebuild without aid the deteriorating parts of the city's structure
to meet changing needs and functions of urban areas." William L. Slayton, The
Operation andAchievements of the Urban Renewal Program, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 14, at 189, 191. He identified two basic
obstacles: first, the "problem of assembling a number of parcels, under diverse
ownerships, in order to create a tract large enough to support efficient modern
development and at the same time withstand the effects of adjacent blight," id. at 191,
and second, the tremendously high cost of assembling the site. Id. He added that
remedying these two basic obstacles became the principal goals of the original
redevelopment statutes. Id.
33. DANIEL R MANDEUC ET AL, HousNG AND COmmuN'y DEvE~oPmwr CASES AND
MATERIALS 431 (1981).
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local matching dollar in cash; the rest was all public works and
similar credits."
34
Meanwhile, the federal government continually relaxed the
housing link. Again, this was the result of extensive pressure
from local political officials. For example, under the original
legislation, projects could only involve clearance of a slum
area that was "predominantly residential in character" or
clearance of other land to be developed for "predominantly
residential uses."05 By 1965, thirty-five percent of federal
grants could be spent in non-residential areas and for non-
residential projects.36 As Friedman and others have noted,
over time these amendments created-greater local discretion
in the types and goals of projects funded with federal outlays,
and were simultaneously the product of intense local lobbying
of federal officials. 7
These amendments resulted in the emergence of redevelop-
ment that truly could be defined as downtown development
because that is the development local elites wanted to achieve.
Frieden and Sagalyn conclude that, like the federal highway
program, federal redevelopment programs "were pliable enough
to invite cities to define them according to their own needs."38
This fluidity, linked with local political and economic pres-
sures, resulted in redevelopment serving downtowns almost
exclusively. The evidence is compelling: "over the entire
twenty-five-year life of the program ... 82 percent [of all urban
renewal funds went] for projects within two miles of [the city
center] .3
Finally, with Richard Nixon's "new federalism" in 1974, for-
mal federally sponsored redevelopment ended. The Community
34. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 27. The extravagance of federal support
led to many projects which, in fact, were utterly devoid of market reality. Because the
local jurisdiction often pursued projects designed merely to "clear" undesirable areas,
and because economically speaking the project was a free "put" on a real estate option
market, the local jurisdiction had no incentive to tailor the property to development
needs.
35. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 110, 63 Stat. 420
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1988)), omitted by Housing and Communi-
ty Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 652 (current
version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)).
36. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 24. In a sense, this slackening of the
housing focus was a blessing for low-income communities, because it no longer
required the destruction of housing to pursue redevelopment.
37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 163-66.
38. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN supra note 11, at 22.
39. Id. at 25.
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Development Block Grant (CDBG)40 program, however, picked
up where redevelopment left off. The CDBG process repre-
sented a shift from prior "single purpose or categorical grants
to a more flexible concept of block grants, so that recipients
[could] expend funds on a myriad of local activities according
to locally developed priorities."4' CDBG provided even greater
local discretion than the redevelopment program had before.
Although used for many purposes, CDBG grants always have
had a primary role in funding downtown redevelopment
projects.42 With the 1977 amendments, and the addition of the
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program,43 federally
funded redevelopment remained in vogue.
Although the federal program called "redevelopment" or
"urban renewal" disappeared in 1974, slum clearance and
redevelopment still were authorized under the new CDBG
legislation.44 Under the CDBG and UDAG programs, creative
city officials could jerry-build local property tax increment
financing-or tax abatements-with federal funds to create
redevelopment projects that satisfied local political and market
demands.45 In the meantime, with the formal demise of cate-
gorical grant programs, local discretion increased both within
and outside the law. A report by the Government Accounting
Office condemned the Housing and Urban Development's
(HUD's) monitoring practices.46
40. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit.
I, § 101, 88 Stat. 633 (current version as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5318a(h) (1988
& West Supp. 1994)).
41. MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 33, at 450-51.
42. Though couched in terms of increasing local control and returning power to
the people, New Federalism and similar allocations of money or power to local discre-
tion must be viewed as extremely regressive strategies. In short, the lower the level
of office, the smaller the voter turnout and the less legitimate the representation can
be considered. Because older, better educated, and wealthier people vote more
frequently, their vote is magnified at the local level more than it is at the federal level.
Meanwhile, in the context of local development decisions, cash grants with local
control must have been viewed as manna from heaven by powerful developers and
footloose corporations that would manipulate these programs to force various
jurisdictions to compete to provide sites for new facilities. See infra note 132.
43. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, tit.
I, § 119, 91 Stat. 1125 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)).
44. MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 33, at 431.
45. "The bulk of UDAG grants have gone to central business districts, ironically
for civic center improvement, sports stadia, and luxury hotels, the principal benefi-
ciaries of urban renewal under the old categorical grant programs." Id. at 481.
46. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CED-78-160, MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION OF THE
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED, at i-ii,
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Although UDAG funding has disappeared and CDBG funding
has declined, redevelopment has continued. Though now more
locally driven and controlled than ever, a critical federal
funding mechanism .remains. The latest federal incarnation
consists of the interest income deduction on tax-exempt bond
financing.
47
When an agency issues tax-exempt bonds, the interest
income paid to the bondholder is not taxed by the federal
government. Therefore, the bondholder will accept a lower rate
of interest than for fully taxable bonds. By failing to tax
interest income, the federal government and all federal tax-
payers are subsidizing the project funded with those bonds.
Sagalyn conservatively estimates that the subsidy attached to
one year's tax-exempt bond borrowings in 1984 would have
been about $1.2 billion. 41 "In contrast, over the 25-year life of
its urban renewal program, the federal government spent, on
average, $520 million annually."49 This "back door"5 subsidy
exceeds the value of direct federal outlays under the old
programs.
As direct federal subsidies were removed, project feasibility
began to be determined by capital markets rather than by
federal criteria. "Since [bond] marketability was paramount,
Wall Street's technical standards for underwriting, guarantees,
reserve funds, and disclosure-rather than public policy
criteria-determined project acceptability." 1 Inevitably, these
new constraints limited the power of city decision makers in
negotiations with developers and bond issuers.
The new power of capital markets has been a mixed blessing.
These new public/private partnerships are less ambitious and
more circumspect, as they must operate without federal subsi-
dies which formerly covered over sixty-six percent of the public
11-15 (1978) (indicating that HUD neither collected the necessary data nor created
appropriate standards to assure itself that federal funds were being distributed in
compliance with the law). In addition, Mandelker et al. comment, "HUD has historical-
ly ignored citizen administrative complaints and has generally resolved all disputes
in favor of grant recipients." MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 33, at 507.
47. For a further explanation of the federal deduction's impact on financing, see
infra Part II.B.
48. Lynne B. Sagalyn, Explaining the Improbable: Local Redevelopment in the
Wake of Federal Cutbacks, 56 AM. PLAN. ASS'N J. 429, 432 (1990).
49. Id.
50. This is a "back door" subsidy because, rather than providing a direct subsidy,
the government makes a tax "expenditure" by not taxing the income earned as interest
from these bonds.
51. Sagalyn, supra note 48, at 433.
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cost.52 These projects are tailored more closely to private
developers' requests. This increased responsiveness to market
forces is somewhat of an improvement. On the other hand, the
removal of federal direct redevelopment outlays has reduced
whatever incentive to devote redevelopment efforts to public
uses that previously may have existed. That is, without federal
subsidies, project managers became much more insistent that
developments pay for themselves. This results in redevelop-
ment which is more and more driven by development and
capitalistic elites. The post-federal projects are smaller and less
dramatic in the scope of displacement they require, 3 but they
also are removed further from the possibility of achieving
benefits for low-income residents. The increase in power of
capital markets has further removed project area residents
from the picture.
The detailed workings and criticisms of redevelopment will
be discussed further below. At the outset, however, it is
important to understand that the fundamental tools of
redevelopment have been adapted and implemented by local
jurisdictions with great fluidity in the face of changing market
pressures and evolving federal and state programs. Redevelop-
ment programs have continued over the intervening years
while changing names, shape, and details because the basic
tools are extremely valuable to local real estate development
and related economic development goals of local elites. As
Friedman presciently noted, redevelopment will not go away.54
52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
53. Frieden and Sagalyn claim that, by the end of the 1970s, "the days of big
clearance projects were over." FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 56. This statement
is either wrong or is based on a cramped definition of "big". clearance. For example,
in the past year, the author personally has worked to stop or amend two separate
projects (one is the Gateway 101 redevelopment project area in East Palo Alto,
California, and the other is a proposed redevelopment project for "Highway City" in
Fresno, California). Based on a working knowledge of the area, the author estimates
that each one of these projects could displace over one thousand people-in each case
overwhelmingly Latino populations. Destroying the housing and community of over
one thousand people must be considered "big" clearance.
54. Lawrence Friedman wrote in 1968 that:
[U] rban renewal is here to stay .... Urban renewal, after all, despite its political
troubles, has many ways to disarm opposition. It makes enchanting promises
to solve urban problems and holds out glittering visions of the City Beautiful;
... in any given case, urban renewal can appeal to strong economic or political
interests. Not least of all is its bureaucratic power ... in the hundreds of local
agencies created in states, cities, and villages-agencies which will fight for their
life with great passion. The program, then, may be wounded or altered; ... it
may change names; but it will not die.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 171-72.
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It also is important to note that as direct, visible federal
involvement waned, so too did the scrutiny of redevelopment.55
When up-front federal financing of urban renewal disappeared,
the only source of oversight for these projects disappeared
along with it. Abused though they were, the federal reloca-
tion,56 local participation,57 and housing planning require-
ments58 were at least potentially effective tools for resident
input concerning redevelopment. At a minimum, they provided
plaintiffs with federal causes of action5 9 by which they could
gain hearings with federal judges who were removed from the
political pressures of state courts. With the removal of up-front
federal funding, the lightning rod of visibility also was re-
moved, leaving local jurisdictions to proceed in relative quiet.
As a tool for revitalizing the city, redevelopment is often
sloppy, irrational, and cumbersome. Nevertheless, it is also
extremely powerful in many ways. Redevelopment must be
considered in any discussion of revitalizing the city because it
is so prevalent across jurisdictions. Further, local action will
likely become continually more important to the issue of
revitalizing central cities as federal programs retract from
addressing city concerns. Meanwhile, of course, redevelopment
implicates tools that are historically local in nature and
exercise: property taxes, land use, and eminent domain.
55. On one count, this reduction in concern was entirely natural: every state had
slightly different enabling legislation and redevelopment procedures. To maintain
expertise in all 50 states, and to monitor what few reporting requirements individual
states imposed on redevelopment efforts, would be a Herculean task. In short, the
spreading and diversifying of new federalist redevelopment achieved one of the goals
of new federalism-reduced scrutiny of regressive policies that are pursued nation-
wide, yet no longer are national.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1969).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1451-1455 (1969).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1457 (1969).
59. See, e.g., Tenants in Opposition to Redevelopment v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 406 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (ruling, inter alia, that
residents of a redevelopment project area had standing to sue under the Federal
Housing Act (FHA)); see Western Addition Community Org. v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp.
433, 440-41 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (ordering a preliminary injunction compelling HUD to
comply with its own regulations regarding relocation of residents); CHESTER W.
HARTMAN, YERBA BuENA: LAND GRAB AND COMMUNITY RESISTANCE IN SAN FRANCISCO
123-57 (1974) (discussing the factual and political context of federal court litigation
concerning inadequate relocation plans for displaced residents of San Francisco
redevelopment project area). In particular, Hartman shows the connection between
the Western decision and the decision to proceed in the Yerba Buena litigation. Id.
at 123-24.
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B. The Redevelopment Process
In comparing the locally6 ° controlled and funded redevelop-
ment programs discussed here with earlier federal urban
redevelopment and urban renewal programs, significant
practical differences emerge. The similarities in approach,
theory, and result, however, overwhelm any differences.
Significantly, the criticisms presented in this Article concerning
local redevelopment efforts were levied over twenty-five years
ago regarding the federal programs. 6 1 These criticisms have
been presented cogently and calmly-as well as in a scattered
and hysterical manner-again and again over that period with
little or no resultant change in the programs. This observation
indicates that a fundamental concern stifles reform: redevelop-
ment's constituent powers are simply too significant in the eyes
of local political and economic elites to disappear.
1. Agency Powers-To begin redeveloping, the local jurisdic-
tion must first establish a redevelopment agency under state
enabling legislation. Although legally a redevelopment or urban
renewal agency is a distinct entity from the city or county that
sponsors it, in reality the city council or the county board of su-
pervisors often serve as the agency. In other cases, the agency
is a quasi-private corporation given public powers, usually
under the nominal control of local government. 3
60. More recent manifestations of redevelopment are essentially local, except for
the federal subsidy through tax-exempt bonds and occasional mixing of CDBG and
other federal funds (notably highway or transit funds) into redevelopment projects.
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
61. The reader will note that a great many of the sources cited in this Article
were originally critical of the earlier federal programs. This bibliography has been
chosen advisedly. In subsidizing the wealthy, excluding the poor, or writing law review
articles, there is very little new under the sun.
62. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33200 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that
"the legislative body may... declare itself to be the agency" upon a finding that such
an action is in the public interest).
63. For an example, see Pennsylvania's Urban Redevelopment Law:
There are hereby created separate and distinct bodies corporate and politic, one
for each city and one for each county in the Commonwealth, as herein defined.
Each such body shall be known as the Redevelopment Authority of the city or
the county, as the case may be, but shall in no way be deemed to be an instru-
mentality of such city or county, or engaged in the performance of a municipal
function.
35 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1704(a) (1993).
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Though the two are closely related, an agency and its spon-
soring local government are distinct corporate entities with
very different legal powers and obligations. For example, the
additional property tax revenue generated in a project area
does not revert to the general fund of the sponsoring city until
the project ends. Instead, the agency keeps the money to repay
the bondholders and carry out redevelopment purposes.s4 Only
when all those bonds have been retired will the tax revenue
revert to the sponsoring jurisdiction. Because of this division,
the agency cannot use its newly generated tax revenue to fund,
for example, local city police and fire services, while the city
must continue to provide those services. Conversely, the city
cannot issue bonds without voter approval and generally
cannot sell land for less than the price for which it was pur-
chased, while the agency may do both of these things and is
created for just these purposes. Thus, while it is a convenient
shorthand to describe redevelopment projects as city efforts,
this reference is incorrect both legally and practically.
Once created, the agency then identifies a zone within its
jurisdiction in which to encourage development," and adopts
a redevelopment or renewal plan for that zone. Once approved,
the redevelopment plan is a broad charter of authority for the
agency to conduct redevelopment activities within the geo-
graphic boundaries of the project area. Although plans usually
will specify some project or projects that are the goal of the
redevelopment effort, typically these projects are extremely
general and are not mandated by the plan. Thus, the redevel-
opment agency maintains broad discretion over real estate
development within the redevelopment project area for many
years. Redevelopment plans frequently will limit this authority
only in the most general terms by, for example, capping the
amount of tax increment the agency can receive from the
project area over the life of the plan, limiting the use of emi-
nent domain after a fixed amount of time has passed, or
establishing a time limit on the project area. These limitations
typically are mandated by state enabling legislation.66
64. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-205(a)(2) (1992).
65. The criteria used to select a zone is significant and complex. A critique of this
method could comprise a separate article itself.
66. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33333.2 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing
a time limit of 12 years for the use of eminent domain and 30 years for the effec-
tiveness of the redevelopment plan).
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Within the zone-usually called the "project area"-the agen-
cy's powers are immense. Agencies can and frequently do: take
property by eminent domain for site-assembly; issue bonds
without voter approval by pledging revenue from leases,
property and sales taxes, and a variety of other funding
streams as a guarantee for repayment; sell property at less
than fair market value; conduct toxic abatement; pay for
infrastructure, parking, lighting, sewers, and grading; provide
direct financial assistance including outright grants, loan
guarantees, and low-interest loans; provide land use benefits
such as density bonuses6 7 and easing of other land use regula-
tions of general application; and encourage any sort of develop-
ment or uses that it deems fit.
2. Tax Increment and Tax Abatement Financing-
Agricultural land, mines, even whole states, may fall vic-
tim to technological change and population movements, but
not central business districts. Ponce de Leon's fountain of
eternal youth was supposed to apply to them even though
the fountain had to be found in the federal treasury.68
-Norton E. Long
With the demise of direct federal outlays, redevelopment
agencies found a new fountain of youth in Tax Increment
Financing (TIF). TIF provides an independent funding source
for the redevelopment agency of a municipality that seeks to
subsidize local development.
The TIF scheme itself is simple. In a typical community,
property taxes are paid to the county assessor semi-annually.
The county assessor then allocates this tax money to public
schools, the county, the city, and any other local governmental
entity or special districts-mosquito abatement districts for
example-with a claim on a property tax dollar generated lo-
cally. As an illustration, assume that a redevelopment agency
has declared a project area consisting of four square blocks.
Before the project area was declared, the annual property tax
revenue from this area was $100,000. Once the project area is
67. A "density bonus" occurs where a jurisdiction grants a developer the right to
develop at higher densities-i.e., more stories on the building-than is generally
allowed by existing zoning.
68. Norton E. Long, Local Government andRenewal Policies, in URBAN RENEWAL:
THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 14, at 422, 425.
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declared, the redevelopment agency will receive all future
property tax revenue from those four blocks which exceeds the
$100,000. The agency receives this tax money for the life of the
project area. Although the length of time varies by jurisdiction,
frequently a project area will exist for forty years or longer.6 9
Meanwhile, for those forty years all the other governmental
entities must continue to operate by dividing the original
$100,000.70
A closely related concept is tax abatement for favored devel-
opment. A tax abatement occurs when the city offers to reduce
the taxes of a specific entity in exchange for locating in a
project area. Though related, tax abatement is different from
TIF. The beauty of TIF is that property taxes, an inescapable
cost of doing business, are used to pay for the developer's end
product-the development itself.7' By contrast, tax abatements
are accumulated over time and are not easily capitalized and
converted into up-front investments in a development.7 2 A
second benefit of TIF is that under TIF, the property owner
continues to pay property taxes. For a development firm, state
and local property taxes are deductible from federal income
taxation. With the highest current federal corporate income tax
69. California recently amended state enabling legislation to limit the life of a
project area to 30 years-a 20 year limit on the time period in which an agency can
incur debt plus a 10 year extension-and a 45 year limit on the time period in which
an agency can receive tax increment from a project. This action was considered a
major reform. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33333.2 (West Supp. 1994).
70. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 279.676 (1991) (allocating levied taxes in excess
of the amount produced by the rate of the tax at the time the ordinance is passed to
the redevelopment agency to fund its debts); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 457.420-.460 (1993)
(distributing ad valorem taxes among urban renewal agencies and providing that
these agencies determine how much money must be raised). California, however,
allows for pass-through agreements, whereby agencies will pass on some portion of
the property tax increment to taxing entities within the zone, at the discretion of the
agency. Recently, California law was amended to require pass-through payments to
total approximately 20% of tax increments over the life of the plan. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 33676 (West Supp. 1994).
71. The agency sells bonds based on anticipated property tax revenue, and uses
that money to assist the very developers who will pay the property taxes later. In
essence, the agency loans developers their own tax money up front. Some states,
rather than entitling an agency to incur debt based on its claim to future tax
increment, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40B, § 14 (1992), will simply empower the agency to give
future property tax credits to developers. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 63, § 31A(f) & (j)
(West Supp. 1994). This way the developer does not receive an initial subsidy, so the
scheme can be less desirable from a developer's point of view, but the net effect is the
same: the property taxes which the developer or subsequent owner pays as a normal
cost of doing business actually are passed back to the developer.
72. Of course, with tax abatement, money remains in the developer's pocket.
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rate at thirty-five percent,7 the property tax is deductible and
the amount paid reduces federal income tax liability by thirty-
five cents for every dollar of property tax. Thus, the developer
not only has its property tax payment support up-front funding
necessary to its development, but it also gets to deduct that
payment from federal income taxes. With a local property tax
abatement, neither of these benefits accrue. Finally, to the
extent that it gratifies the developer, continuing to pay proper-
ty taxes entitles the developer to grouse about tax and other
local problems with the "business climate." The money gained
from tax increment financing can be spent for redevelopment
purposes at the discretion of the agency overseeing the redevel-
opment.
3. Site Assembly: Eminent Domain and Blight-The vast
majority of statutes-which authorize the allocation of TIF to
local redevelopment agencies also authorize the. power to
assemble property using eminent domain. State enabling
statutes typically then limit the use of both TIF and eminent
domain to "blighted" areas.74
Most analysts view eminent domain as the power of primary
importance; it is more accurately viewed, however, as a subset
of the overall site assembly and land write-down 75 process.
After all, the sponsoring city already had eminent domain
powers. Eminent domain only becomes particularly controver-
sial when it is used in combination with the agency's additional
powers.
Eminent domain is the power of the government to take
private property for a public purpose after payment of just
compensation.76 In the redevelopment context, the key legal
obstacle is to identify the public use which necessitates the
taking. Here, the public use which justifies eminent domain
73. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (1993).
74. This connection of tax increment with eminent domain within blighted areas
stems from the original federal legislation and its slum clearance purposes. Housing
Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 110, 63 Stat. 414, 416, 420 (originally
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1460 (c) (1988)), omitted by Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633,652 (current version
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)). Although there is no necessary connection
between revitalizing a city-or its downtown-and using TIF solely in blighted areas,
this historical linkage has been maintained. At least one jurisdiction, Minnesota, does
not link TIF and blight. See MINN. STAT. § 466A.02(2) (1989). The failure of the blight
requirement is discussed infra Part III.C. 1.
75. Land "write down" also flows from the original federal legislation. See supra
note 29.
76. See RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.3 (4th ed. 1991).
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powers is the removal of blight. This issue is significant be-
cause the agency immediately will transfer the property to a
private party who will develop and use the property for private
gain. In Berman v. Parker,77 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Congress' redevelopment enabling legisla-
tion for the District of Columbia and determined that the
redevelopment agency could take non-blighted property by
eminent domain and transfer the property to other private
parties without violating the constitution. 78 The Court wrote,
"[slubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive."09 Given that blight, as defined
by statute, in fact exists, and given that Congress had deter-
mined that removing blight was a public purpose, removing
blight was well within the traditional police powers of govern-
ment. Once the purpose was upheld, the tools for achieving
that goal were also for Congress to determine. Hence, eminent
domain may be utilized across an entire area "rather than on
a structure-by-structure basis"8" and it can be combined with
private development.8' Congress believed that "the piecemeal
approach, the removal of individual structures that were
offensive, would be only a palliative. The entire area needed
redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be
developed for the region ....",2 States were entitled to adopt
the same approach in their enabling legislation and typically
did so. The courts thereafter acquiesced without question to
legislative determinations both that removing blight was a
public purpose in the context of redevelopment and that the
extraordinary powers of redevelopment were necessary to
achieve that purpose.
Eminent domain typically is justified as necessary to enable
quick and efficient site assembly.83 The agency will assemble
77. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
78. Id. at 34.
79. Id. at 32.
80. Id. at 34.
81. After all, "[t]he public end may be as well or better served through an agency
of private enterprise than through a department of government---or so the Congress
might conclude." Id. at 33-34.
82. Id. at 34.
83. For example, Charles Abrams has noted that:
[Ideally tihe power of land assemblage makes possible the establishment of
contiguity between plots and the bringing into use of land with unmarketable
titles that have held up development of whole sections; it facilitates the
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the necessary parcels, allowing the private developer to avoid
negotiating separately with each individual property owner
within a zone, thus escaping holdout problems.8 4 Eminent
domain powers are justified as necessary-at least as a fall
back threat-in order to secure the necessary parcels at an
acceptable cost.85 This power is difficult to quantify, but it may
provide the greatest subsidy to developers during redevelop-
ment.
Blight is an extremely nebulous characteristic, although
decision makers claim to know it when they see it. 8 Born of
the original Federal Housing Act of 1949, the blight require-
ment originally was intended to focus redevelopment efforts on
slum clearance." The blight requirement was designed to
ensure that extraordinary state powers will only be used in
circumstances where, as California's statute states, "the
redevelopment of blighted areas cannot be accomplished by
private enterprise alone."88 The fact that an area meets the
statutorily enumerated conditions that constitute blight
justifies the presumption that private capital is unwilling to
invest in the zone. Hence, the eminent domain assembly
subsidy, and the subsequent write down in price, are justified
by the need to make this parcel competitive in the market for
development.
synchronization of public and private improvements as well as the planning of
cohesive shopping centers.
Charles Abrams, Some Blessings of Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy,
reprinted in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 14, at 560.
84. Observers have identified as major obstacles to private redevelopment of
"slum" areas the large number of individually owned parcels in a typical project area
and the probability that individual property owners would hold out and refuse to sell
except at exorbitant prices. The Housing Act of 1949 sought to redress the difficulties
of"private assemblage of tracts of land under diverse ownerships and the exceptional-
ly high cost of assemblage due to inflated values by speculative holders of land."
MESSNER, supra note 27, at 7. Eminent domain powers solved these perceived
problems.
85. This plausible explanation for the necessity of governmental site assembly,
however, does not resolve the issue. As noted infra in Part III.B.2, the economic effects
of site assembly are not clear in terms of resource efficiency or distributive equity.
86. Blight is defined differently from state-to-state. New Jersey, however, is
typical in requiring that proposed projects in the blighted area "would not be
accomplished by private enterprise without public planning and assistance in... [site
assembly]." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-256(a)(4) (West 1986).
87. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 102, 68 Stat. 414
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1451-1460 (1988)), omitted by Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633,
652 (current version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)).
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33037(b) (West 1973).
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C. Forces Driving Use of Redevelopment
Cities turn to redevelopment because of a potent combination
of political, fiscal, and economic pressures. Logan and Molotch
identify the importance of "growth machines" to every commu-
nity's political and economic life, 89 and Mollenkopf identifies
progrowth coalitions as a central feature of local and national
political life.90 Bennett also identifies elite coalitions comprised
of business interests and local elected officials as instrumental
to urban development in many cities.91 In each of these con-
structions local elite groups vie and compete over growth. In
each case the competing groups turn to redevelopment to
pursue their goals. Plainly, those who are well-connected, both
politically and economically, drive this process and seek out the
special development subsidies that redevelopment powers
enable.
Moreover, the interests of these groups in pressing for
redevelopment dovetail with the predominant explanations for
city decline-a fiscal crisis born of faltering investment, shift-
ing populations, 92 disinvestment,9 3 and the perceived evolving
economic role of the city in the national economy. 94 Under this
view, the elites were challenged with preparing their local
jurisdictions for these economic changes.95 Local elites all
89. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 8, at 32-38 (explaining that local entrepreneurs
coordinate among themselves to lobby for intensified "value-free development").
90. JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY 4 (1983) (defining"progrowth coali-
tions" as "political entrepreneurs bring[ing] together widely different; competing, and
even conflicting political actors and interests by creating new governmental bases for
exercising new powers").
91. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 20-21 (identifying "corporate caretakership" as one
of these urban power arrangements).
92. For a discussion of black migration to urban centers and its effects on politics
and urban demographics, see NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND 61-107, 225-305
(1991) which provides a historical case study of a few individuals' move from
Clarksdale, Mississippi to Chicago, Illinois during the 1940s and 1960s.
93. See, e.g., Nancy Christopher et al., Comment, Urban Redevelopment and the
Fiscal Crisis of the Central City, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 820, 826 (1978) ("Lured by the
potential profits of vast new suburban markets, retail trade establishments also began
to desert the central city ....").
94. See Richard C. Hill, Crisis in the Motor City: The Politics of Economic Develop-
ment in Detroit, in RESTRUCTURING THE CITY, supra note 12, at 80, 105 (discussing the
prediction that the city would cease to be a manufacturing center and instead become
a command and control center for the corporate economy).
95. See HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 44-73 (discussing control of urban develop-
ment in San Francisco by its mayors and the San Francisco Development Agency);
see also LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 8, at 257-67 (discussing typology of cities which
best perform as centers of corporate control).
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responded with an identical strategy when faced with these
crises: stimulate investment, usually in the form of downtown
redevelopment. Thus, "[tihe variety of subsidy/compensation
schemes is enormous .... [Tihe idea that a better city can be
achieved by more jobs, money, tax revenue, and so forth is
entrenched in local economic development efforts."96 This
framework places those with the capacity to invest firmly in
control of the process. In the face of competition between cities,
redevelopment subsidies are called upon to win scarce invest-
ment dollars.
Although many observers have noted that a significant
component of the relative decline of central urban cores can be
attributed to national policies that directly support suburban
development-such as the interstate highway system, the
home-mortgage interest deduction,98 FHMA lending criteria,99
the failure to address redlining and other discriminatory
practices, I00 and defense spending prioritiesl0 -the response
to urban decline was not to end suburban subsidies or redirect
them to the central cities. Rather, the response of local jurisdic-
tions was to further subsidize central cities thereby making
them friendlier to investment. In particular, given the political
and economic pressures, investment in downtown projects
became the goal. Redevelopment in its various incarnations
was and remains a critical component of this effort.
In addition, both TIF and tax abatements permit an agency
to assist development with public money without an obvious
tax increase. City officials typically suffer from the "edifice
complex"-they seek development as evidence of accomplish-
ments achieved by their administration to compete with
neighboring jurisdictions, to place their town or city on the
map, and to fulfill planning goals and visions. If the goal of
96. Richard D. Bingham & John P. Blair, Urban Economic Development, Introduc-
tion to URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11, 13 (Richard D. Bingham & John P. Blair
eds., 1984).
97. James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: A Historical and Legal Analysis
of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547,
568-69, 571 (1979).
98. Id. at 602-03; see Harold A. McDougall, Affordable Housing for the 1990s, 20
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 727, 748-49 (1987) (explaining that revisions of the Internal
Revenue Code have increased the significance of the home-mortgage deduction).
99. Kushner, supra note 97, at 567-68, 581.
100. Id. at 566-71, 598-602.
101. See ANN R. MARKUSEN & JOEL YUDKEN, DISMANTLING THE COLD WAR ECONOMY
171-72 (1992) (noting that cold war defense spending slighted the nation's industrial
heartland).
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encouraging development can be met without an obvious tax
increase, the process builds compelling political pressure for
the use of tax redevelopment. 10 2 The prevailing argument that
the private development encouraged by TIF subsidies may
trickle down or spillover to benefit the rest of the city, or at
least the neighboring communities, provides ideological support
for subsidizing development.'
Likewise, city decision makers furnish the argument that
only by offering the subsidies will the city be able to lure
greater capital investment from private funds. In the inter-
jurisdictional competition for scarce development dollars, a city
will find it difficult to justify refusing to spend twenty million
dollars when such expenditure may induce fifty million dollars
of private investment. Few politicians will walk away from
such an opportunity.0 4 Fewer still are willing to risk disprov-
ing the hypothesis that downtown investment will benefit the
remainder of the city.'0 5 All these political forces militate for
the use of redevelopment in the service of downtown develop-
ment.
102. An excellent example of this syndrome at work is the current efforts of the
City of Fresno to build a minor league baseball stadium in the heart of their down-
town. The development group advocating the stadium does not have a baseball team
lined up nor does it have necessary financing. See Jeff Davis, Group: Fresno Will Get
a Team, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 9, 1994, at C1. Fresno, however, has nonetheless committed
$5 million of city and redevelopment money to the project. Plainly, logic and economics
demand that the city not support this project, but the political pressures have
overwhelmed these concerns. See Jim Wasserman, Don't Rob Southwest for Stadiurt
Downtown, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 18, 1994, at B1.
103. See Levine, supra note 2, at 104; Robert Mier, Job Generation As a Road to
Recovery, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 34 (Robert Mier ed., 1993).
104. As Fainstein and Fainstein note:
In order to raise capital to promote commercial and industrial investment, cities
... have sought to direct tax revenues toward specified ends rather than the
general fund .... [T]hese various measures, justified as producing economic
development and employment, undercut what was one of the original arguments
for government-sponsored redevelopment projects-that they would add to the
municipal tax base and thereby support the level of services required by cities
with large dependant groups and fleeing middle-class populations.
Susan S. Fainstein & Norman I. Fainstein, Economic Change, National Policy and
the System of Cities, in RESTRUCTURING THE CITY, supra note 12, at 1, 19-20 (citations
omitted).
105. For a concise refutation of the notion that development inevitably, or even
usually, benefits the city overall, see LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 8, at 85-98
(arguing that urban growth often has an adverse impact on many segments of the
population as well as the environment).
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Finally, and surprisingly, powerful downtown interests fre-
quently meet in the proverbial "smoke-filled room" to devise
and pressure for downtown development. In case study after
case study, an elite downtown planning organization, usually
operating in secret and invariably made up of prominent
bankers, developers, and law firms, serves as the heavy in a
project and pushes and directs redevelopment in accordance
with the groups' needs.106
III. COMMON CRITICISMS
The criticisms of redevelopment that have developed over the
years are numerous and telling. This Part summarizes the
most forceful of them. It is a tribute to the resilience of
redevelopment as practiced under the control of local political
leaders that the process has withstood compelling critiques
from the libertarian, the market liberal, the left of the political
spectrum, and more recently from the Community Economic
Development perspective. Again, this resilience reflects the
strength of the forces that push for redevelopment.
The purpose of this summary is to flesh out in detail the
many problems with redevelopment as practiced. These criti-
cisms both justify the reform that is so desperately needed and
generate the criteria by which reform proposals may be judged.
A. Libertarian Critique
The first and most common criticism at the local level flows
from the "small government" quasi-libertarian right. Its
proponents are identified frequently with property taxpayer
revolt movements such as the Jarvis/Gann organization in
106. Examples of such interest groups include "The Vault" in Boston, MOLLENKOPF,
supra note 90, at 159 (acquiring its nickname "because it met in The Boston Safe
Deposit and Trust Company boardroom"); SPUR in San Francisco, HARTMAN, supra
note 59, at 37-38 (representing business interests of private institutions); the City
Committee in Indianapolis, ROBIN P. MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM 108-09 (1991)
(having membership by invitation only and consisting of"[30] successful male execu-
tives"); and the Greater Baltimore Committee in Baltimore, Levine, supra note 2, at
106 ("controlled by an elite organization of 100 ... corporate executives").
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California, which spawned the property tax limit Proposition
13.107 These critics are outraged that government officials are
entitled to take personal property under eminent domain,
borrow money to pay for it, give the property to someone else
at below cost, and use tax revenue to cover the loss.
The criticism proceeds along the following lines. It is wrong
for an agency to use public tax dollars to benefit a private
individual, notwithstanding the court opinions which claim
that redevelopment serves a public purpose.0 8 Libertarian
critics recognize that the TIF process requires hidden tax
increases by forcing the municipality to continue to provide the
same level of services while foregoing the property tax incre-
ment generated in the project area over time.'l 9 These critics
also recognize that these tax dollars may never revert to the
general fund of the municipality. As noted above, the agency
may receive tax increment funds to the extent it has a debt
outstanding. The typical debt is a bond issuance. This bond will
encumber the tax increment stream for a given period of time.
It does not take a particularly creative bureaucrat, however,
to refinance those bonds and thus indefinitely prolong the
redevelopment authority's powers, financing, and existence. 110
Indeed, in California, after decades of redevelopment activity,
"[a] 1984 survey identified only seventeen completed projects
where the planned activities were finished, there was no
further indebtedness, and the agency was no longer receiving
property tax increment revenues.""' In order to remedy this
imbalance, the sponsoring city and other taxing entities have
two choices: (1) raise taxes to maintain the level of services or
107. By amendment of the state constitution, this proposition limited the level at
which local jurisdictions could levy property taxes. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1-6 (1978).
108. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
109. See supra Part II.B.3 for an explanation of the TIF system.
110. This fact has chagrined many early reviewers of the process who, in recogniz-
ing that tax increment financing very often would pay for a municipality's portion of
a redevelopment project and then provide that municipality with greater revenue for
its general fund, failed to recognize that the tax increment flowed to the redevel-
opment agency, not the municipality. Given that redevelopment agencies are
bureaucracies, it is logical to assume that agencies would not willingly release
extensive funding. This is, in fact, the case. Many projects extend well over 30 years.
Thus, while tax increment funds pay for the agency's portion of the project cost, and
in that sense the projects are "money-makers," the city itself does not see a cent of
new property tax revenue to support the many services it must provide. Rather, the
agency retains any annual surplus for further subsidies, its own operations, or to
support its next project area.
111. CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON LOCAL GOV'T, REDEVELOPING CALIFORNIA FINDING
THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR THE 1990S, at B12 (1989).
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(2) keep the tax level stable but decrease the level of services.
In either event, the result is effectively an increase in taxes. 112
This criticism has been well justified empirically. Huddleston
has studied the tax effects of tax increment financing in
Wisconsin. His findings conclude that taxing jurisdictions
which forego tax increments subsidize development in the
sponsoring jurisdiction by losing tax revenue they otherwise
would have received. He writes:
Bayside taxpayers, for example, would pay $50,000 in
school tax increments for the Glendale TIF project (because
Bayside is in the Glendale school district) and $552,100 in
county tax increments for all nine TIF projects (because
Bayside is in Milwaukee County)-even though Bayside
itself does not have a TIF project." 3
Beginning with the premise that government is bad, the
libertarian critics conclude that government in debt is worse. "14
The crowning indignity is that redevelopment project areas
frequently create miniature fiefdoms of economic power with
the tax increment dollars under the control of the agency and
without voter approval." 5
112. Jack R. Huddleston, Distribution of Development Costs Under Tax Increment
Financing, 52 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 194, 195 (1986).
113. Id. at 195.
114. Unfortunately, libertarians often lose credibility and diffuse the significant
strengths of their message with hysterical attacks that merge many issues in an
uncertain jumble of outrage leveled at a vague cabal of government officials drowning
in debt. For example:
We must not forget that the underlying financial backbone of redevelopment
agencies are non-voter [sic] Tax Allocation Bonds which are indebting our
property tax dollars on risky speculative ventures for many years to come.
Remember, redevelopment is financed by debt, which must be piled on top of the
national debt to appreciate its enormity, and which will be repaid by the same
taxpayers who cannot afford to repay the national debt. We do not believe it is
the government's purpose to risk the taxpayers [sic] monies on speculative
growth. The prospects are disastrous for our American free enterprise economic
system.
SHERRY CuRTIs, CITIZEN ADVOCATES, INC. EDUCATIONAL REPORT #2, at 3 (n.d) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
115. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of bond offerings. As one illustrative
example, Boston's legendary Redevelopment Authority Director, Ed Logue, "built the
BRA from a staff of seventeen and a budget of $250,000 into a 700-strong parallel
government with an annual cash flow of $25 million by the time he left in 1967."
MOLLENKOPF, supra note 90, at 166.
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B. Market Liberal Critique
A related but conceptually distinct criticism flows from the
market liberal perspective. Over the past several years, by far
the most eloquent proponent of this view has been Robin
Malloy. In his recent work, Planning for Serfdom 116 he distills
the market liberal critique into three -compelling sub-
arguments. First, government partnerships and co-financed
development often entail a great deal of secrecy and a corre-
sponding lack of accountability. The lack of information regard-
ing benefits and costs prevents the political process from
correcting bad decisions."' Second, given little accountability,
powerful economic actors are empowered to use the political
process to cement and increase advantages already won in the
market."' Third, the development fostered by this process
cannot be justified in a manner consistent with the prevailing
marketplace rhetoric." 9 Cities pursuing redevelopment are
living a free market lie that is hidden from the public.120
. 1. Lack of Accountability-Lack of accountability in rede-
velopment is the product of many forces. First, project planning
and ultimate negotiations typically are carried out in secret.
12 1
Further, the complexity of many of the partnerships masks the
extent and degree of government funding for private projects.122
116. MALLOY, supra note 106.
117. Id. at 126.
118. Id. at 25.
119. Id. at 72.
120. Malloy notes that the gleaming office towers and convention centers produced
by redevelopment "are immediate and durable monuments to the people and political
processes that made them possible." Id. at 9. Yet, he claims these developments also
reflect a negative revision of the philosophical underpinnings of our society which is
"[n]ot so visible and seldom, if ever, discussed .... This [revision] involves an implicit
rejection of important normative values concerning freedom, liberty, individualism,
private enterprise, and democracy." Id.
121. Malloy cites the secretive City Committee as the generator of many real estate
projects in Indianapolis. "[T]he members of the City Committee were the politicians,
Lilly Endowment officers, real estate developers, contractors, bankers, lawyers, and
other professionals who eventually became primary actors in receiving, directing, and
managing various public/private enterprises." Id. at 108-09. It is almost gratuitous
to note that the City Committee "included only one Black member and no women."
Id.
122. Sagalyn, too, notes example after example of city decision makers who either
did not understand how much government support went into various deals or
consciously misrepresented the facts. She writes:
In personal interviews, when we asked mayors and top city administrators how
much they had put into their new retail centers, typical answers were "nothing
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The availability of information concerning relative costs of
certain actions is of course a prerequisite to efficient resource
allocation. The diffuse mixing of public and private resources
through largely secret decision making makes it impossible for
the public to measure either the opportunity costs or amount
of tax dollars their government spends. 123 Malloy states that
"[tihe troubling element ... is that legitimate and critical
evaluation of government activity is being foreclosed." 24
Governmental accountability and any likelihood of the political
process correcting itself therefore are reduced. Malloy notes
with particular disdain what a great many others have ob-
served: the abject failure of the local press to present issues
fairly or even intelligently. 125 Naturally, this failure drops the
level of discourse still further.
at all' or "very little." Further questioning revealed that most mayors and
administrators did not consider federal aid to be money the cities spent, nor did
they count off-budget outlays as actual spending, and when project appropria-
tions were spread over several years, they lost track of what had been spent in
the past.
Sagalyn, supra note 48, at 433. Contrary to public officials' perceptions, in a study
of major redevelopment projects in 38 cities, Sagalyn reports finding that "public
direct spending ... ranged from ... 3 percent to 83 percent of total development cost
• . "with a median of 31 percent." Id.
123. As Malloy observes:
It is relatively easy to point to the new office building or shopping center
constructed in downtown Indianapolis. It is next to impossible, however, to deter-
mine which taxpayers actually paid for the project and, more important, which
towns and people elsewhere in the state or country lost out on real estate
projects or jobs because of the advantage Indianapolis gained from public funds.
MALLOY, supra note 106, at 115-16.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. Failure to understand redevelopment and lack of objectivity is apparently
epidemic in the press. Malloy explains that even the conservative local Indianapolis
Star tends to side with the cheerleading interests, while "presenting contrary views
in minimal detail and frequently only after key decisions have already been made."
Id.; see also HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 68-73 (outlining the shameless boosterism
of local press in promoting redevelopment, ignoring critics, and failing to present
accurately the facts of the situation). In addition, Hartman refers to a Boston critic's
similar observations:
Herbert Gans' reports about press coverage of Boston's notorious West End
urban renewal project show marked parallels with the Yerba Buena Center
story: ". . . [Tihe Boston press not only favored the redevelopment of the West
End in repeated and enthusiastic editorials, but also covered the news only from
the point of view of the Redevelopment Authority. . . . Features, moreover,
depicted the West End as a vice-ridden set of hovels in which respectable human
beings could not be expected to live ....
Id. at 70 n.t (quoting HERBERT GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS 172 (1962)). Finally, the
author's personal experience on numerous projects has been that the press rarely
understands the issues involved or challenges official pronouncements.
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2. Economic Power Controls Political Power-Redevelop-
ment is a process whereby political criteria and values substi-
tute for those of the market in locating development. Malloy
presents the abuse of local political power for personal gain by
the wealthy and privileged that redevelopment enables. In
short, increasing political power over market activity is likely
to buttress and reinforce the privileges gained from the mar-
ket.12 In Indianapolis, "co-financing," as Malloy dubs redevel-
opment efforts, favors a select few. For example, a single
developer was selected for "at least two major office buildings,
a downtown hotel, renovation of a theater and ballroom, and
a downtown shopping store. The same developer is also in-
volved with Market Square Arena ... and is behind the city
plan for $400 million in construction for a downtown shopping
mall .... 127
At its root, redevelopment substitutes political mechanisms
for the market as a means for allocating resources. Malloy
believes this substitution is wrong and creates inefficient
development decisions. He suggests that if a project makes
economic sense, developers will build, and if it does not make
economic sense, they should not build. Though he concedes a
role for local government in development, he believes this role
should be limited. Government should only encourage develop-
ment that is necessary for the public good and that the private
market will not usually create. 2 '
126. A great many other observers confirm this conclusion. See Christopher et al.,
supra note 93, at 840 (summarizing the special support in St. Louis from the city's
Community Development agency for Ralston Purina, Washington University, and a
former mayor turned developer). In this regard, these and other authors also note the
failure of the successor federal program, Community Development Block Grants
(CDBG). Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit.
I, § 101, 88 Stat. 633 (currentversion as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5318a(h) (1988
& West Supp. 1994)). In St. Louis, large portions of CDBG funds went to upper- and
middle-income whites instead of benefitting the poor or assisting with housing
construction for anyone. Id. at 840-41. As explained by Frieden and Kaplan, "[1local
diversions from the national purpose are not just occasional abuses, but rather form
a pattern inherent in the [act's] implementation." Bernard J. Frieden & Marshall
Kaplan, Urban Aid Comes Full Cycle, 9 CIv. RTS. DIG. 12, 23 (1977). These problems
flow from the economically powerful using the political process to cement their
economic gains.
127. MALLOY, supra note 106, at 104. As Adam Smith has written, "[pleople of the
same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversa-
tion ends in a conspiracy against the public." 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
144 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776).
128. Id. at 124-25. Malloy writes: "[Alcceptable types of projects for urban develop-
ment are limited and can be justified only when there is true market failure, and the
government's involvement in correcting the market failure is within the traditional,
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After all, hotels, shopping centers, office buildings, and
restaurants are not like dams or airports. The former are
types of investments in which private enterprise always
has invested. Thus, the primary objective of many current
urban development and revitalization arrangements is not
to encourage activities that otherwise would not occur, but
rather to encourage these activities in locations apparently
deemed undesirable for investment by private parties.'29
This logic also can be applied to discredit redevelopment
funding to subsidize development projects that the market
would have built without subsidy. For example, the downtown
office boom many jurisdictions enjoyed in the late 1970s and
1980s was largely a product of market forces in place before
redevelopment assisted such projects-and many cities enjoyed
an office construction boom whether or not it took place in
redevelopment project areas."30 The market supported such
development, so it happened. Likewise, Frieden and Sagalyn
note that urban shopping malls developed successfully in the
late 1970s in part because "the ripe. development climate that
had made suburbia an easy place to build new malls was
changing at an accelerating pace."' 3 ' Thus, the market drove
limited confines of activity necessary to insure individual liberty." Id. at 138. His
prescriptions are, as proponents of critical legal studies movement would claim,
"radically indeterminate." For example, the market arguably fails to remove slum
housing. Supporters ofearly redevelopment believed that clearing slum housing would
increase the liberty of former slum dwellers. Others believed that clearing the housing
would increase the economic competitiveness of the entire city: certainly eminent
domain is an ancient civic power. Given these facts, removing substandard housing
was a necessary social goal thatjustified governmental intrusion into local economies.
This logic would support the original Federal Housing Act of 1949 which created
redevelopment. Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, tit. I, § 2, 63 Stat. 413 (originally codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1460 (1988)), omitted by Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633, 652 (current version as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441(1988)). Rather than philosophy guiding Malloy's results,
the results are governed by an evaluation of the facts and more fundamentally, by
what one considers to be "the facts."
129. Id. at 124-25.
130. For example, in San Francisco only one small section of the developed down-
town is in the redevelopment project area. The vast majority of the office towers that
have sprung up next to and surrounding purportedly blighted property were created
in response to market pressures.
131. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 81. Likewise, those authors describe at
length the efforts of the Pasadena Redevelopment Agency to lure and create a
downtown shopping mall, efforts which ultimately proved successful. However, current
visitors to Pasadena will note that the thriving shopping district is not the mall and
is not even in a redevelopment project area. Rather, it is in distinctive buildings in
"old town" that began their renaissance as thrift stores, artist lofts, and other outlets
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urban mall development, redevelopment subsidies did not.
Redevelopment subsidies both encourage construction that the
market does not support and unnecessarily support develop-
ment that the market would produce without interference. In
either case, the reallocation is inefficient. 132 A primary example
of redevelopment subsidies being thrown at a form of develop-
ment that would have happened without the subsidy is the
stampede to trap sales tax. Communities will compete against
each other for "big box retail" outlets'33 with a track record of
generating significant sales tax.13 4 Indeed, the competition is
so fierce that until 1993, California law entitled a redevelop-
ment agency to rebate a percentage of sales tax-the quest for
which purportedly justified the expenditure of redevelopment
subsidies in the first place-to a retailer as an added induce-
ment to businesses shopping for a location.3 5 Redevelopment
for local creativity entrepreneurs who required low rent. As that area became more
trendy and arty, the cache, expense, and desirability of the area continued to grow.
For the most part this can be attributed to the quality and beauty of the old buildings
in that zone. The market worked in that location without redevelopment.
132. Jones and Bachelor explain that "[tihe extraction of concessions by a corpora-
tion beyond what would be strictly necessary to attract the facility" is called "the
corporate surplus. This surplus is the result of a hidden hand of large-scale corporate
capitalism superimposed on a patchwork of small territorial governments competing
among themselves." Bryan D. Jones & Lynn W. Bachelor, Local Policy Discretion and
the Corporate Surplus, in URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 96, at 245, 247.
Obviously, the amount strictly necessary to attract a facility often may be zero or even
a negative amount.
133. "Big box retail" refers to the many types of retail entities that typically sell
low cost goods out of glorified warehouse-type spaces. The store is in effect a big box.
Typical examples include Home Depot, Costco, Wal-Mart, and K-Mart. Jurisdictions
are particularly enamored of these entities because of their proven track record in
generating significant sales tax revenue for the sponsoring jurisdiction. See Morris
Newman, Nobody Plays the Redevelopment Game Better than Price Club, CAL. PLAN.
& DEv. REP., Aug. 1991, at 12.
134. Morris Newman describes Price Club as "[a]n affluent company, the self-styled
'original cash-and-carry membership store' [which] pushes hard to make cities
subsidize its land costs and other infrastructure. Financially creative, the retailer
often demands and receives a sizable rebate of sales tax." Id. at 10. Newman adds the
observation that although Price Club demands redevelopment subsidies, Price Club
development has nothing to do with proper redevelopment. "Instead of cities using
incentives to lure companies into depressed market areas where those companies
wouldn't otherwise locate, Price Club stakes out a market area and then plays all the
cities in that market area off against each other." Id.
135. See CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 7202.5 (West Supp. 1994). This law recently has
been repealed to bar this subsidy for new projects. 1993 Cal. Stat. 942 § 37. Like Price
Club, Wal-Mart has factored in both property tax subsidies, i.e., up front redevelop-
ment subsidies that serve as rebates on future property taxes, and sales tax rebates
into its base-line financing for a project. Newman later reported almost identical
tactics by Wal-Mart, in particular playing competing cities against one another. Morris
Newman, Wal-Mart Takes a Page from Price Club's Book, CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP., Dec.
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as practiced is inefficient because subsidies flow to a retailer
which has already decided to locate somewhere in the general
vicinity. The magnitude of subsidy dictates the exact location
of development.
The decisions produced by redevelopment frequently are
inefficient from a capital resource allocation perspective. Even
if an office tower is fully occupied, it is possible that the new
building has just taken non-subsidized occupants from neigh-
boring sites. The TIF subsidies may have helped create a fully
occupied Class A office tower. Meanwhile, the older Class B
office towers nearby stand nearly empty. Did the city's economy
gain anything from this? Similarly, a new retail mall will raid
successful preexisting businesses in a community. As the
number and quality of shops in the older shopping district
decline, so too will the number of shoppers.'36 The city expend-
ed resources, office workers work in nicer buildings, and shop
owners have nicer stores, yet on a macroeconomic level the city
gains nothing-because the agency expended subsidies on
increasing investment in the built environment, rather than
increasing investment on the firms that would inhabit the built
environment.
Thus, Malloy creates an elegant vision of how redevelopment
disturbs what he views as the proper balance between govern-
ment and the market and thus enables government to benefit
1991, at 12. Here he raises the reasonable question that given redevelopment's
purported purposes, rather than subsidizing Wal-Mart, "shouldn't the cities really be
subsidizing Wal-Mart's [mom and pop] competitors in hopes of helping them survive?"
Id. That would be the logical step if local decision makers viewed existing small
merchants as their clients.
136. As a somewhat unusual example of this phenomenon, San Francisco recently
has completed a new Museum of Modern Art in its Yerba Buena redevelopment project
area. As a result, art galleries from trendy neighborhoods across the city are facing
intense pressure to relocate nearer to the new museum and the perceived "hot
market." See Clifford Carlsen, Galleries Get the Picture: Renaissance Spells Profit, S.F.
Bus. TIMES, July 15-21, 1994, at 13. Building the museum alone, however, cannot
create more galleries. Rather, it relocates existing galleries.
Already, the fine arts gallery scene-traditionally centered tightly around
Grant Street and the Union Square area-has moved south toward the new
public venues.
"I moved here because of the new museum," said Stephen Wirtz ....
"The opening of Yerba Buena and the move of the Modern has further
marginalized those that aren't downtown," [one proprietor] said. "I now feel a
need to be downtown."
Id. (emphasis added).
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the powerful-in ways that are often very inefficient in eco-
nomic terms. Economic power attracts governmental power for
support, which in turn increases economic power ad infini-
tum.
137
3. Ideological Dissonance-Finally, Malloy argues that the
"can do" environment of governmental entrepreneurialism and
city-booster politics creates a dissonance between the ideology
of free market entrepreneurism and the reality of a develop-
ment process channeled and subsidized by local state govern-
ment on behalf of the powerful and the connected. 13 ' He does
not merely accuse redevelopment officials of hypocrisy. Rather,
he plainly believes that free market entrepreneurism is a
valuable ideological underpinning of our society and should be
supported. He believes that redevelopment does violence to this
ideal. 39 Simultaneously, he argues that actions taken under
redevelopment cause significant damage to the economy.-4
Although these criticisms are compelling, three flaws inhere
in the market liberal argument. First, the mere fact that
government intrusion is apparently at odds with the existing
ideological hegemony regarding the market, individualism, and
freedom does not mean that the process is at odds with
anyone's actual feelings about the market and individualism
in reality.' Indeed, to expect practice to change to fit the
apparent dominance of ideology is naive. The better approach
is to assume that practice will reveal our true ideological
preferences. Thus, rather than controlling reality, the apparent
137. MALLOY, supra note 106, at 125.
138. Id. at 125-26.
139. Id. at 125.
140. Id.
141. Indeed, the business leaders most likely to espouse a free market ideology
are most intimately involved in redevelopment as practiced. As Frieden and Sagalyn
note:
Nobody can deny the central role of business executives in the rebuilding of
downtown areas .... But where were these business leaders when Baltimore
bulldozed the houses of 10,000 families, 90 percent of them black? ... Or when
Los Angeles pushed five freeways through its main Mexican-American neigh-
borhood? .. .The answer must be that they were deeply implicated in these
events. One of the federal officials who dealt with San Francisco's renewal
program said of its director, Justin Herman: "Herman could move rapidly on
renewal--demolition or construction-because he was absolutely confident that
he was doing what the power structure wanted insofar as the poor and the
minorities were concerned."
FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 56.
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ideology serves to legitimize and camouflage a reality which
would not enjoy widespread support if exposed.
Second, given reality as expressed by actual practice, it is
plain that redevelopment under local jurisdictional control will
serve those interests that local politicians view as their true
constituency. No evidence supports the idea that local public
officials would voluntarily limit their activity to areas that the
market does not serve, as Malloy's philosophy would mandate.
Malloy offers no mechanism, other than the force of his well-
reasoned argument, that would implement his suggestion for
reform.
In addition, even if, through some unknown process, rede-
velopment did "encourage activities that otherwise would not
occur,"142 redevelopment officials would not necessarily pursue
projects different from those they pursue currently. From
creating jobs to improving the tax base, to building a world-
class city, local actors at least claim to believe that the devel-
opment they strive to generate would not have occurred but for
their help. Likewise, it does no good to argue that these local
efforts only served to locate business activity in a particular
jurisdiction which would have selected a nearby site in any
event. This fact flows from the nature ofjurisdictional competi-
tion and from the political -pressures inherent in redevelop-
ment. The only important fact to local decision makers is that
the development ultimately located in their jurisdiction. 143 In
short, Malloy is entirely correct that redevelopment subsidies
and efforts are usually economically inefficient and that
development does not result in a net benefit to a region. This
point also is entirely irrelevant to local decision makers. Local
decision makers believe the result is beneficial to them, and
that is all that matters.
44
Third, Malloy relies extensively on the market as the better
allocator of resources and a better decision maker than gov-
ernment over time. This position is probably true. Yet, the
market is imperfect in so many ways that to present it as a
legitimate counter-position to government action is not defen-
sible. As Malloy notes several times, a free market approach
142. MALLOY, supra note 106, at 125.
143. It also is important to local decision makers that an "undesirable" project
selected a site outside of their jurisdiction, in the case of affordable housing and other
forms of development aimed at low-income individuals.
144. See also Sagalyn, supra note 48, at 433 (indicating that most mayors and
development officials "did not consider federal aid to be money the cities spent").
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can only be justified if it results in the promotion of individual
freedom and expanded opportunities. 145 In that regard, it is not
a priori clear that resident-controlled redevelopment could not
further those goals for poorer members of society whom the
market ignores.
In short, from a low-income community perspective, the
market has failed as miserably as the government-or, more
accurately-the two have combined together to fail spectacu-
larly. Simple reliance on the market will not address the needs
of such communities. Thus, for such communities Malloy's
prescription fails. Nonetheless, any revision of redevelopment
must take into account the concerns about government account-
ability, political process, economic efficiency, and individual
freedom that he raises.
C. Left Critique
The primary criticism from the left of the political spectrum
proceeds as follows. Redevelopment serves as a funnel of0resources from the low-income many to the already-rich few,
very often with racial antagonism lurking just below the
surface. 146 Critics from this vantage point agree with Malloy
145. MALLOY, supra note 106, at 81.
146. See, e.g., Kushner, supra note 97, at 583-98 (singling out federal-state urban
renewal programs and suburban zoning regulations as significant contributors to
continuing segregation); Levine, supra note 2, at 110-15 (demonstrating that
Baltimore's African-American residents derived little benefit from the revitalization
of Metro Center, while real estate developers, financiers, suburban professionals,
tourists, and the urban gentry benefitted lavishly); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement
and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333, 369-71
(1984) (stressing the exclusionary effects of reinvestment upon long-term low-income
residents who cannot afford the increased rents which "upper class housing values"
impose); Christopher et al., supra note 93, at 822 (criticizing redevelopment programs
that provide only "token" and therefore inadequate plans for low-income housing
relocation while catering to private investment and business restoration); Louise
LaMothe Wheeler, Note, Community Controlled Renewal in California: Some Proposals
for Change, 23 STAN. L. REV. 148, 148 (1970) (depicting inadequate renewal programs
that focus on beautification and ignore the pressing needs of the urban poor); see also
BENNETT, supra note 15, at 72 (claiming that locations for gentrification projects are
sometimes based on racial composition of neighborhoods and citing Chicago's East
Garfield Park as an example); Long, supra note 68, at 426-27 (lamenting that federal
programs often aid the investments of those who can afford housing, and neglect to
subsidize housing for the African-American urban poor, in order to attract political
support); Derek Shearer, In Search of Equal Partnerships, in UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIPS:
THE PoLTICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT iN POSTWAR AMEauCA 289 (Gregory D.
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that the agency expends its funds and exercises its powers on
behalf of rich developers or upper-class users of downtown
developments. Meanwhile, area residents and businesses suffer
many uncompensated and undercompensated costs of relocation
which allow a developer to reap the profits from the develop-
ment. 147 Meanwhile, the jobs which downtown development
locates overwhelmingly go to upper-income residents of neigh-
boring suburbs. According to this analysis, TIF and eminent
domain, combined with the blight requirement, create a huge
risk to low-income communities. This critique rolls several
independent criticisms into one for effect. The following sub-
sections separate out the constituent elements for clarity.
1. Distrust of Blight Designation-What Lawrence Fried-
man observed twenty-five years ago remains true today:
"Finding blight merely means defining a neighborhood that
cannot effectively fight back, but which is either an eyesore or
is well-located for some particular construction that important
interests wish to build."148 Flowing from this observation, it is
Squires ed., 1989) (concluding that review of case-studies warrants the "harsh
judgment" that vaunted post-federal-redevelopment "partnerships" are nothing but
'urban renewal by another name" resulting in "grossly unequal partnership[s] with
inequitable outcomes" that pay little attention to "the benefits that might flow to the
less fortunate urban residents or to their neighborhoods," and that equate progress
with big construction while ignoring "the basic needs of most city residents"); Alan
E. Harris, Comment, Urban Renewal in the Bay Area: The Need to Stress Human
Considerations, 55 CAL. L. REV. 813, 820-26 (1967) (arguing that the goal of urban
renewal should be to "improve urban life, not urban buildings" and advocating
resident participation to meet that goal).
147. As Mandelker et al. note:
[1]f agencies really did their homework and studied the available supply [of
housing], it is likely that projects would be stalled, modified or stopped because
the resources were not there. The ultimate impact would be that the real costs
of public improvement projects would be reflected in the project budget rather
than being hidden in the form of housing deprivation to displacees and its
ultimate destructive impact on the community.
MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 33, at 547-48. For general discussions of displacement
and the typical inadequacies of relocation assistance, see Chester W. Hartman,
Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 745 (1971); Kushner, supra
note 97, at 559-66; Salsich, supra note 146, at 333-70; James A. Kushner & Francis
E. Werner, Illusory Promises Revisited: Relocation Planning and Judicial Review, 8
Sw. U. L. REv. 751 (1976); Richard T. LeGates & Chester W. Hartman, Displacement,
15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 207 (1981); Christopher et al., supra note 93, at 832-36; Note,
In the Path of Progress: Federal Highway Relocations Assistance, 82 YALE L.J. 373
(1972). This literature is extensive and depressing. Further, the author's experience
with several redevelopment projects in California indicates that the 'bad-old-days"
are not behind us.
148. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 159.
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clear that blight either serves as a convenient incantation to
justify the use of redevelopment powers for a project that was
already planned, 149 or alternatively, as a description of the
environment that must be uprooted to preserve the city's self-
image.150 With the collapse of federal funding, one would hope
that clearance redevelopment is on its last legs. Unfortunately,
because of racial and class animosity, this result is unlikely.
These two archetypes of redevelopment engender different
abuses in the blight-finding process.' 5 '
(a) False Blight-When redevelopment is construction based,
the possibility of falsely designating an area as blighted
skyrockets. If an agency wants a specific building, or wants to
locate a certain retailer in a particular location, then it can
simply make the finding of blight to enable the subsidies
redevelopment offers.'52 To the extent true blight does not
exist, or to the extent the development would have located
there without government funding, designation as a blighted
area is both illegal and a waste of taxpayer money. 53 False
blight, therefore, deprives the poor of governmental resources.
(b) Real Blight Without Concern for Residents-Blight often
can be found in a low-income neighborhood. However, blight
149. This is sometimes called "construction redevelopment." Id. at 155.
150. This is sometimes called "clearance redevelopment." Id.
151. See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the legal consequences of finding
blight.
152. For example, a 1970 Wall Street Journal article explained that:
[Tihe [San Francisco] redevelopment agency considerably broadened the meaning
of the designation "blight" in order to achieve the current boundaries. Ironically,
the project now bears a remarkable resemblance to a plan first suggested in 1954
by Benjamin Swig.... However, Mr. Swig's "San Francisco Prosperity Plan" was
rejected by the redevelopment and planning agency in 1956 on the grounds that
it "perverted' the basic reason for redeveloping the area in that there was no
true blight.
Henry E. Weinstein, Urban Renewal Lesson Still Unlearned, WALL ST. J., May 27,1970,
at 12, cited in HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 76.
153. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 149-51 (noting an unfounded blight designation
violated the Housing Act of 1949). Whether or not a project area is "blighted" is a fact
determination based on the criteria set forth in state enabling legislation. If the
criteria are not actually met and the area still is declared a blighted project area, and
this designation goes unchallenged, all the subsidies are technically illegal. Most state
enabling legislation and related civil procedure codes, however, provide for an
extremely short window of opportunity in which a plaintiff would be allowed to
challenge the finding of blight. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33360-33363
(Deering 1986); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1250.350-.370, 1260.110, 1260.120 (Deering
1986). If the blight findings are not challenged during the statutory period, the blight
is presumed to exist whether in fact it does or not.
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does not necessarily indicate the need for redevelopment or for
clearance. Nor does the finding of blight in any way indicate
a particular solicitude for the residents of that area on the part
of decision makers. Indeed, more often than not, animosity is
likely the emotion that fuels the process.i 54 Not only will the
community have been forced to live with the unpleasant
conditions which resulted in the blight designation, but after
redevelopment it will often suffer from the redevelopment
itself. Worse than blaming the victim, this process is criticized
as punishing the victim in the name of progress. 55
(c) Irrationality of Blight Requirement-The left critique also
believes that the blight requirement is a charade. The main-
stream justifications for the blight requirement are unsatisfac-
tory. Rather than serving a compelling purpose, today blight
is a convenient incantation that justifies development subsidies
on behalf of powerful interests: if you want redevelopment
subsidies, first find blight. Under Berman v. Parker,'56 once
blight is determined, the courts presume a public purpose and
thus justify the many subsidies that flow to developers from
redevelopment.
In addition, the left critique notes that private capital's
refusal to invest in an area is an odd precondition for determin-
ing that an area is blighted. The gentrification phenomenon'57
demonstrates that private capital is eager to invest in many
154. As an example of projects designed to clear away unwanted residents,
Friedman cites one official who said: "'Tennessee's distinctive State capitol at
Nashville once was surrounded by some really sorry slums. These now have been
leveled, eliminating an eyesore that was increasingly difficult of explain to visitors.'"
FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 155 (quoting James W. Follin, Slums and Blight, A
Disease of Urban Life, Address of the Urban Renewal Commissioner (May 3, 1955),
in URBAN RENEWAL BULL. No. 2, at 1 (HHFA, n.d.)) (emphasis added). Friedman also
cites "clearance" redevelopment in St. Louis that was driven by the fact that "people
going and coming to work ... are offended by the state of decay they witness....
Unfortunately, too, every visitor... by train is given a poor impression of St. Louis
as he or she is transported ... through such dismal districts." George B. Nesbitt,
Relocating Negroes From Urban Slum Clearance, 25 LAND ECON. 275, 275 n.2 (1949),
cited in FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 156 (emphasis added). Friedman correctly notes
that the "welfare of the residents in that particular area is not a central concern of
the program." FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 156.
155. BENJAMIN B. QUINONES, FACING UP TO TAX INCREMENT FINANCING, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND LAW CENTER REPORT 12 (1993).
156. 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
157. The gentrification phenomenon refers to the displacement of low-income
individuals by young affluent homeowners as they "discover" downtown residential
areas, renovate homes, and thereby raise rents.
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run-down areas if other conditions are met.158 Moreover, pri-
vate developers often are the motivating force behind the
creation of a redevelopment project area.'59 This fact certainly
suggests that private developers are eager to invest in such
areas. 6 ° Thus, the theory that justifies using redevelopment
subsidies to lure reluctant capital to blighted areas is question-
able. Proponents of redevelopment offer two explanations for
the blight requirement, both of which fail.
First, the lower property values of "blighted areas" are
evidence of the "prisoner's dilemma"1"1 caused by property
owners' interdependence. Consolidating the site under one
ownership will therefore reduce that market inefficiency and
generate greater investment. Though appealing, this explana-
tion does not withstand scrutiny. If the explanation for low
investment is property owner interdependence, then one must
-ask why other neighborhoods within the same jurisdiction with
greater or equal interdependence are not blighted as well. Even
assuming that blight can be defined in any legitimate way,
property owner interdependence is not a satisfactory explana-
tion of its presence. Nor is slum clearance or redevelopment the
indicated response to such a prisoner's dilemma. Property
158. Very often redevelopment, by destroying older, higher-quality construction
containing a certain degree of charm, makes gentrification impossible. Bennett writes:
One of the intentions of most urban renewal projects was to lure typical
gentrifiers, young professionals and entrepreneurs... yet much gentrification
has occurred in neighborhoods that were bypassed by urban renewal. The charm
and historical resonance of such neighborhoods are, of course, at the opposite
end of the aesthetic spectrum from the highrise communities built under the
auspices of urban renewal.
BENNETT, supra note 15, at 17.
159. In the author's experience, the vast majority of new redevelopment project
areas have been. driven entirely by private development interests. In already
established project areas-which continue for perhaps half a century-it is ludicrous
to assume that, if the agency was at all successful in the early years, private capital
would not want to invest there in the later years without subsidy.
160. This fact also suggests that private developers, who pursue maximum profits,
are eager to receive redevelopment subsidies whenever remotely possible-whether
necessary for the development or not. Given the intense competition between jurisdic-
tions, and the inequality of information and negotiating skill between the developers
and city staff, it is likely, that redevelopment unnecessarily subsidizes many develop-
ment projects. See Jones & Bachelor, supra note 132, at 262-63.
161. The prisoner's dilemma refers to the paradoxical scenario in which, if all
members of a group cooperate they will achieve the most beneficial outcome for all.
The paradox arises because, despite the possible benefit, each individual has an
incentive to sell out the other because she does not believe the other members will
cooperate. Thus, all members sell out, and everyone is worse off.
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owner association covenants, increased code enforcement acti-
vity, and tightened zoning are all cheaper to implement and
well within historical city powers. In addition, blight is not
relevant to the possibility of higher economic use through the
reduction of property owner interdependence. In many instanc-
es, the highest level of investment and the highest economic
return for investment in land would come from the redevelop-
ment of areas that are already wealthy, expensive, and highly
invested.
A second proffered explanation for requiring blight is the
social benefit-which purportedly can be measured in terms of
economic welfare-of "slum clearancb" and removal. This
explanation, however, is patently false and historically wrong.
The simple fact is that when slums are razed, the low-income
people who lived there must move somewhere else. Housing
segregation on race and income lines, as well as the chronic
shortage of affordable housing, limit their options. Moreover,
the redevelopment that takes place does not generate jobs for
these people-they remain a low-income class. The left critique
claims that the social benefits simply do not materialize.'62
2. Depriving the Poor of Resources-Given limited fiscal
budgets, the left critique adds that it is simply a misallocation
of scarce public sector resources to target funding at the rich
and away from the needy.'63 Redevelopment subsidies actually
can serve to increase poverty by reducing services. A recent
study of redevelopment in Baltimore demonstrates that even
through the TIF projects were widely viewed as successful,
Baltimore's economy performed worse than most comparable
cities during the years of its "renaissance."'64 Poverty worsened
as well: "In 1970, 9.7% of city neighborhoods had high concen-
trations of poor residents .... By 1980, that figure had in-
creased to 16.6%."165 It is morally questionable to allocate
scarce tax dollars to developers when the result harms the
poor. 1
66
162. See infra Part III.C.3.
163. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 94, at 109 ("The corporate-center strategy imposes
a redistribution of public resources between classes within the Detroit political
economy. Elected officials offer tax breaks and social investment subsidies to business
to succor investment, while reducing social consumption services to residents in
Detroit's neighborhoods.').
164. Levine, supra note 2, at 111.
165. Id. at 112.
166. In addition, it can be argued that such misallocation of resources is economi-
cally inefficient as well. See infra Part III.D.
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Proponents of redevelopment commonly respond to this
criticism with the argument that tax increment resources are
generated by increases in property tax values within the zone:
but for agency subsidies, development would never have
happened. They argue that the poor were not benefited before
the redevelopment, and therefore have lost nothing by not
receiving the tax revenue that flows from it. This response to
the left critique deserves some analysis, but generally cannot
withstand scrutiny.
First, to the extent that additional taxes are raised or
services are reduced elsewhere in the jurisdiction over the life
of a project area, this argument is simply wrong. Those re-
sources have been diverted by the project. 167
Second, to the extent that tax increment revenues are part
of broader real estate inflation in the market generally, the
argument is wrong and measurably so. The degree to which
this is a factor will depend on the local real estate market and
inflationary pressures. For example, in California in the 1970s
and 1980s, it is clear that real estate inflation-not agency
effort--created a huge portion of tax increment across the
state.168
Third, it simply is impossible to know what sort of develop-
ment would have occurred without redevelopment and diver-
sion of taxes to developer subsidies under a regime in which
that process is not possible. Developers will seek out the
greatest subsidy consistent with other market and financial
parameters. In a regime that offers the powerful subsidies of
redevelopment, a developer would be foolish to develop outside
a project area if other concerns were equal. 169
167. Huddleston, supra note 112, at 95.
168. See CALIFORNIA ALMANAC 193 tbl. 21.1.93 (James S. Fay ed., 6th ed. 1993).
Obviously, any increase in taxable valuation that resulted from broader market
inflation would not be "earned" by the agency. In addition, one must subtract from
the tax increment revenues deemed to be "earned" by the agency any buildings that
were committed to build in the project area before adoption of the redevelopment plan
as well as any increase in taxable valuation triggered by resale of an existing building
that was not impacted by redevelopment. See infra note 169.
169. As set forth quite elegantly by P. Wallin and C. E. Dilkes, the true measure
of tax increment "earned" by a redevelopment agency requires that several compo-
nents of tax increment first be subtracted out:
The appropriate formula for determining the contribution of redevelopment to
increases in assessed valuation on a City, regional, or State level, is a 'net, net,
net' computation derived as follows:
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Thus, agencies do not have proof that they have "earned" tax
increment kept from other entities. An agency earns tax
increment if its subsidies are necessary for development. Yet,
what if they could prove it? To the extent subsidies are neces-
sary for the sort of development that downtown powers seek,
the market is signalling that such development is not need-
ed,170 and social welfare and the displaced community send the
same signal.'7 1 Ironically, the fact that the developments
pursued may need subsidies bolsters the lesser argument that
tax increment could not have been generated without agency
activity, while it undercuts more fundamentally the very
legitimacy of agency action-except in that rare instance where
the resident poor are the primary beneficiaries of development
which so fights the market.
172
3. Displacement and Housing Destruction-Due to the
federal precursor legislation's preoccupation with slum clear-
ance, and due to local indifference or hostility to low-income
Total assessed valuation:
- Less base year assessed valuation;
- Less assessed valuation increases attributable to inflation;
- Less assessed valuation from development which was already
committed prior to the adoption of the redevelopment plan;
- Less assessed valuation from development which would have
been developed elsewhere in the City, Region or State, but
developed instead in the project area because of project subsi-
dies;
- Less assessed valuation which would have developed in the
project area notwithstanding redevelopment;
- Less assessed valuation reduction in existing developments in
the City, Region or State competing with the project develop-
ment, and declining in value because of the impact of subsi-
dized competition.
P. WALLN & C.E. DrLKES, REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA: COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM 11-12 (1976) (on file with the University of Michigan.Journal of
Law Reform), cited in Sonia B. Molho & Gideon Kanner, Urban Renewal: Laissez-Faire
for the Poor, Welfare for the Rich, 8 PAc. L.J. 627, 658 n.143 (1977). The last three
components cited here are created strictly because our development regime allows the
subsidies of redevelopment.
170. See MALLOY, supra note 106, at 131.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 131-33. At most, these proponents of redevelopment can claim that a
particular sort of development would not have taken place in a particular spot but
for redevelopment subsidies. Of course, this claim is not the same as "development
would not have taken place." Moreover, this form of subsidy fosters generic cookie-
cutter development that has strong adverse opportunity costs to our economy. By
catering so diligently to the demands of developers and major corporate end users,
redevelopment serves to genericize the built environment across the nation. This
stifles creativity and economic adventure.
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residents, housing and redevelopment must be discussed in
tandem.173 A resident of a "blighted" area that becomes a
redevelopment project and who has no control over the redevel-
opment plan can expect redevelopment to displace him from his
home.174 In addition, destruction of housing and forced displace-
ment likely will result in overcrowding and increased rents in
neighborhoods just outside of the project. This occurs because
displaced individuals do not move far from where they used to
live,'75 and because of the regional tightening of the low-income
housing market generated by wholesale destruction of housing
units through redevelopment, highway construction, and
gentrification.1
76
The deleterious effects of destruction of housing stock and
forced displacement of poor individuals, families, and commu-
nities were recognized many years ago. 77 Displacement brings
173. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 151. Friedman observed that the federal
urban renewal statute was not focused
upon the urban poor, but upon the urban slum; high-cost housing, it was
thought, eliminated blight and slum conditions just as efficiently as low-cost
housing, and perhaps a good deal more so. Not that anybody deliberately set out
to disguise as a low-cost housing program one which was secretly intended to
build apartments for the rich; but the act was a planners' and businessmen's act,
with nods to the housing worriers.
Id.
174. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 147, at 229; see supra Part III.C.1.
175. HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 89.
Most relocation studies, particularly of downtown area displacement projects,
indicate that persons tend to relocate in a highly centripetal pattern. In a
Minneapolis study, for example, 70-80 percent of the displacees moved within
a one-mile radius, and in a New Jersey study 74 percent of the displacees moved
within six blocks.
Id. at 89 n.o.
176. "Once all or part of the low-cost housing units in an area disappear, owners
of surrounding low-cost units raise their rents in response to the increased demand.
The displaced persons therefore not only lose their homes, but generally wind up
paying increased rents for housing of the same or lower quality than that which they
lost." Molho & Kanner, supra note 169, at 635. See also infra note 227 and accompa-
nying text (describing conditions for successful rent control in a gentrifying market).
177. See LeGates & Hartman, supra note 147, at 210; see also Marc Fried, Grieving
for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND
THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 14, at 380, 396, 402 (suggesting that relocation brings
about feelings of grief, distress and helplessness due to the disruption of interpersonal
relationships and spatial identity); Chester W. Hartman, The Housing of Relocated
Families, in URBAN RENEWAL, supra note 14, at 293, 321-22 (concluding that relocation
results in increased housing costs without significant improvement in housing
quality); Basil Zimmer, The Small Businessman and Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL:
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a great and unsought upheaval into the victims' lives. This
upheaval disproves the stereotypical characterization of the
poor as "skid row" transients.'
78
Moreover, logic and economics dictate that many residents
of low-income neighborhoods are long-term residents. Home-
owners may have invested to an extent that prohibits leaving.
In addition, because rents tend to be lower in these areas than
elsewhere in the city, economic factors strongly discourage-if
not totally prohibit-renters from moving out of the neighbor-
hood. Finally, over time, economic establishments spring up in
the neighborhood that can earn an equilibrium return with a
low-income clientele: low-price restaurants, bars, and service
establishments arise and further reduce the incentive to
move. 179 Naturally, informal social support networks also
develop, and are critical to the residents' quality of life. Rip-
ping out these supports can wreak havoc in a community and
on human lives.80
For a time, proponents thought "filtering" would provide
housing to replace destroyed units. Filtering described the idea
that through a chain of interactions, high-end construction
would free up existing units for use by the low-income
displacees.18 ' The filtering theory has been criticized heavily, 82
THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 14, at 380, 396, 402 (noting that
neighborhood businesses are least likely to survive relocation because of loss of
business site and customer base). In addition, observers at the very beginnings of
federal redevelopment were aware of the special 'problem" of relocating African-
Americans displaced by redevelopment projects. "Negro-packed slum areas get little
relief from normal additions to the supply of housing or from the filter process....
The toughest part of the difficulty is relocating these people and it will have to be
tackled as is [or simply ignored]." Nesbitt, supra note 154, at 275. Unfortunately, this
difficulty was ignored and caused immeasurable damage to the African-American
community in many cities. See also Jay Rumney, The Social Costs of Slums, 7 J. SOC.
IssuEs 69, 83-84 (1951) (arguing that displacement and relocation may have negative
psychological and social effects on displaced families).
178. A 1971 survey of the Yerba Buena project area in San Francisco found that
"more than half of the persons interviewed had lived in the same hotel for at least
six years, and one-third had lived in the same hotel for ten years or more." HARTMAN,
supra note 59, at 119. Even that survey undercounted because it did not include those
who had lived in the same area for a long time but had changed hotels frequently. Id.
179. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMEmiCAN CImES 187-90 (1961)
(discussing the importance of old buildings-with low rents-in local development).
180. As anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon, the author helped to stop a
proposed redevelopment project that would have displaced over 1000 residents from
the Highway City neighborhood of Fresno, California. The area was described by the
developer and city staff as transitory and blighted. In fact, many of the residents were
low-income homeowners who had lived there in excess of 30 years.
181. Anthony Downs, The Successes and Failures of Federal Housing Policy, 34
PUB. INTEREST 124, 127 (1974).
182. See, e.g., Gary Sands, Housing Turnover: Assessing its Relevance to Public
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and even those who believe that it may work in theory have
asserted that it has harmful effects on the urban poor in re-
ality. 1 3 The record is plain: many thousands more units have
been destroyed by redevelopment than have been constructed,
and of those units constructed, only a small portion have been
affordable to low-income residents. l 4 Filtering has not even
remotely made up the difference.'
85
4. Poverty Concentration-A final crushing criticism from
the left is that uprooting one set of poor people and destroying
their homes neither remedies poverty nor solves urban
crises. l" Rather, the displaced residents move to another low-
income neighborhood. Increased demand for low-income hous-
ing results in rising rents and overcrowding, and soon creates
an even worse slum given the multiplier effects of concentrated
poverty.' 7
Policy, 42 AM. INST. PLANNERS J. 419, 425 (1976) (concluding that the actual "vacancy
chain" generated by the construction of higher-income housing was too short to have
a significant effect on the needs of the housing-disadvantaged).
183. Downs, supra note 181, at 127. ("[Flor the poorest urban households,
especially poor minority-group members, this process is a social disaster.").
184. See Kushner, supra note 97, at 590.
185. Downs, supra note 181, at 127 (noting that the trickle-down process "compels
thousands of the poorest households to concentrate together in the worst-quality
housing located in older neighborhoods near the urban center"). Indeed, there is a
glaring lack of studies of the effects of"reverse" filtering, the tearing down of existing
low-income housing.
186. RoBERr A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEw YORK
20, 36-37 (1974). Caro presents a haunting vision of the creation of new slums
neighboring Robert Moses' federal urban redevelopment projects.
The deterioration of his neighborhood, some blocks away from Manhattantown
though it was, had begun not long after Moses had turned over the six-square-
block site to the developers .... [Tihe area had been inundated with a flood of
new residents. And there was no place these residents could have come from so
suddenly and in such numbers but Manhattantown. A project designed-at
immense cost-to clear up a localized, six-block-square slum infection was
instead causing that infection to spread over many more than six other blocks.
Id. at 964-65; see Levine, supra note 2, at 112-13.
187. See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 15, at 53,54 ("Urban renewal also demolished
more housing units than it built .... The resulting residential dislocation accelerated
decay in adjoining neighborhoods as dislocated residents of renewal areas squeezed
into whatever housing was available."); CARO, supra note 186, at 963-65; HARTMAN,
supra note 59, at 99-102; MESSNER, supra note 27, at 69-71; Fainstein & Fainstein,
supra note 12, at 47-49. William Julius Wilson has presented, with great force, the
deleterious effects of concentrated poverty which result in the lack of role models, ab-
sence of employment networks, and dysfunctional schools thus creating an "ecological-
ly and economically" degraded living space. WILSON, supra note 16, at 60-61, 103.
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The internal pressures of the redevelopment process, 188 the
combination of TIF with site assembly powers,' 89 and the re-
quirement that these powers be exercised only in blighted
communities'9" unite to form an unholy trinity. In essence, the
powers and internal pressures create a mandate to gentrify
selected areas, resulting in a de facto concentration of poverty
elsewhere, preferably outside the decision makers' jurisdic-
tion.' 91
Numerous past experiences indicate that the process has
been driven by racial animosity 92 as well as by bias against
the poor.' 93 The net result is that a neighborhood of poor people
is replaced by office towers, luxury hotels, or retail centers. The
former. low-income residents, displaced by the bulldozer or an
188. See supra Part I.B.
189. See supra Part I.B.2 regarding tax increment financing and the goals of city
elites.
190. See supra Part I.B.3.
191. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 226-32 (1991). In addition, in the terribly
poor and overwhelmingly minority city of East Palo Alto on the San Francisco Bay
peninsula, the redevelopment agency adopted a project that was miserable for the city
in every sense, except that it would have replaced a low-income neighborhood with
office towers. A community activist has told the author that city leaders were heard
to support the project, in spite of its flaws, because it would remove some of the poorer
members of the community from a community that was already "overburdened" with
the poor. Telephone Interview with an anonymous community activist in East Palo
Alto, California (Dec. 19, 1994).
192. For example, Frieden & Sagalyn quote Miles Lord, who, as the Attorney
General for Minnesota, helped to oversee land takings for highway construction in
the 1950s:
We went through the black section between Minneapolis and St. Paul... and
we took out the home of every black man in that city. And woman and child. [sic]
In both those cities practically .... Nice little neat black neighborhood, you
know, with their churches and all and we gave them about $6,000 a house and
turned them loose onto society.
FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 11, at 28-29 (quoting the transcript of remarks at the
U.S. Justice Department Condemnation Seminar, Virginia Beach (Oct. 30, 1979)).
193. For example, in June, 1971, the San Francisco Examiner felt obliged to
editorialize concerning the current Yerba Buena residents stating:
"Neither do we believe that such people should have the right-in the absence
of some compelling reason deeply rooted in the public good-to delay and quite
possibly kill a major public project of profound importance to the economic well-
being of a city that is not really their home community, that they have built no
stake in, that they make no attempt to adorn, and to which they are on the
whole an unsought burden.'
Yerba Buena Functions as a Creator of Jobs, S.F. ExAMINER, June 11, 1971, at 32
(quoting a Yerba Buena resident), cited in HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 71.
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equally effective increase in rents, must relocate into another
area they can-perhaps-afford.
194
The entire process can be viewed as a strategy of poverty
concentration and geographical containment to protect the
property values-and entertainment choices-of downtown
elites.
One of the key planning concepts applied under Justin
Herman was the "protected environment." In essence, the
idea is to create a cordon sanitaire: surround the central
development of a renewal project with peripheral con-
struction that will provide an effective physical barrier to
deter former residents from moving back into or adjacent
to the area. 195
This concept has been followed in innumerable subsequent
projects. Thus, redevelopment policies within central cities
have served to buttress and reinforce the segregationist policies
pursued by suburbs' which have resulted in the spatial and
economic segregation of the poor and minorities. Student
authors predicted in 1978 that: "[r]edevelopment policies
which, in essence, amount to ghetto relocation, promote a race
194. Excluding the poor is built into the design of redevelopment. For example,
James C. Mao thought redevelopment efforts should seek "a superior pattern of
resource allocation" which would result from
one or more of the three transformations of land use: (1) Transformation in
income class-land is transferred from low-income to high-income users. (2)
Transformation in density-land is transferred from low to high density uses.
... (3) Transformation in activity-land transferred from residential to indus-
trial or commercial use, or vice versa.
James C. Mao, Efficiency in Public Urban Renewal Expenditures through Benefit-Cost
Analysis, 32 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 95, 96 (1966) (emphasis added).
195. HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 89 (footnote omitted); see also Dashka Slater, A
Tale of Two Cities: Emeryville, Oakland, and the Swiftly Changing Face of East Bay
Commerce, ExPRESS: EAST BAY'S FREE WKLY., May 20, 1994, at 20. This article cites a
geographer from the University of California explaining that redevelopment in
downtown Oakland served to create a
visual wall between downtown and East Oakland. ... "Essentially they walled
off all of downtown from the trouble areas. This was the redevelopment plan for
downtown Oakland". . . . Diagram after diagram envisions the old structure of
the city being ripped out, literally bulldozed, and the new fabric protected and
separated from the rest of Oakland by what even the plans themselves some-
times describe as a wall of office buildings, parking structures, or apartments.
Id.
196. See infra text accompanying note 273.
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and class segregation which severely limits the opportunities
of both poor African-Americans and poor whites and perpetu-
ates a social pathology which foreshadows the creation of a
garrison state."197 Any proposal for reformed redevelopment
must address these criticisms from the left of the political spec-
trum.
D. Lost Opportunity Costs
The final vein of criticism flows from the community-based
perspective of the Community Economic Development (CED)
field. This criticism has emerged only recently in the CED field
and explains that redevelopment, as controlled by elites who
pursue downtown development, generates massive opportunity
costs. 198
In the area of physical construction, these lost opportunity
costs are usually enormous. Redevelopment imposes opportu-
nity costs because construction precludes future construction
that may be better suited to the residents' needs, and the
development wastes money that could have been used for more
appropriate projects. A building constructed during redevelop-
ment will not be torn down anytime soon: if a luxurious office
tower is constructed on a certain site, the agency is blocked
from building a youth center there. Similarly, if a project
establishes jobs for lawyers and bankers at a site, the low-
income community will be shut out of the jobs located there.
Moreover, when an agency builds a hotel or retail center, the
jobs housed there are low-skill, low-wage service sector jobs.
As long as the building stands, those jobs, and only those jobs,
will be available at that site. What if, instead, a manufacturing
plant had been built?
An additional opportunity cost is the lost time and effort of
governmental actors pursuing misguided redevelopment. In the
author's experience, adopting a redevelopment plan requires
one year at a minimum. City and redevelopment agency staff
197. Christopher et al., supra note 93, at 881; see also Wheeler, supra note 146,
at 148 ("The record shows that in the majority of cases the energies of urban renewal
are not directed toward the vital needs of the poor, and when they are, the efforts are
minimal and the outcome unsatisfactory to the persons of the target area.").
198. Opportunity costs represent the cost of taking one course of action which
precludes another, possibly more valuable, course of action.
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must review plans, compile environmental impact statements,
hold public hearings, review project feasibility, and retain and
monitor any number of consultants. Negotiations with private
developers also are extensive and time-consuming. In all, a
phenomenal, and usually uncounted, cost in terms of staff time
must be expended to pursue redevelopment projects. Staff
pursue misguided redevelopment rather than fostering entre-
preneurship, helping existing local businesses meet environ-
mental requirements, ensuring excellence in job training
activities, generating networks of firms in the jurisdiction, and
working to improve the education of the youth in the jurisdic-
tion. Staff's inability to focus on development alternatives that
would benefit the central-city poor is another uncounted cost
beyond the real cost of salaries.
Three additional opportunity costs are created by redevel-
opment as currently practiced. These opportunity costs are far
less obvious than the others but in many ways are much more
significant. The opportunity costs flow from redevelopment
because it: (1) constitutes a flawed industrial policy, (2) fails
to serve low-income residents as clients, and (3) creates skewed
risk and reward alignments.
1. Flawed Industrial Policy-As a huge additional opportu-
nity cost, redevelopment has served as a national industrial
policy-albeit one that is remarkably inefficient and ineffective.
Although this observation is unusual, redevelopment carries
all the hallmarks of a national industrial policy. First, redevel-
opment pursues industrial development on a national scale.
Second, because of the "lemming" mentality of city development
efforts, and because so many cities face the same pressures and
have adopted the same strategies in response to these pres-
sures, redevelopment picks the same winners in city after city.
Although this happens jurisdiction by jurisdiction, rather than
by flat of one national bureaucrat, the results are every bit as
stultifying as a formal national policy. Redevelopment has
focused on developing the downtown and on attracting corpo-
rate headquarters as well as the finance, insurance and real
estate (FIRE) industries. More recently, redevelopment has
pursued convention centers, luxury hotels and, in fewer re-
gions, high-tech industrial parks.'9 9 Even more recently,
199. See Roy Furchgo, Baltimore Has Seen the Future, and It Is Biotechnology, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1994, at F7 (noting that inexpensive space is used to attract
biotechnology investors).
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redevelopment has pursued the "big box" retailers that provide
extensive sales tax revenue, 20 0 and redevelopment will soon
serve to locate and subsidize casinos nationwide as it already
does in Las Vegas and Atlantic City. 201 Finally, having picked
a winner, redevelopment supports that winner and subsidizes
what are the normal costs of doing business for other indus-
tries which are not so favored.
The evaluation of these efforts is grim on two counts. First,
in pursuing the sorts of downtown industries that redevelop-
ment traditionally has favored, redevelopment has fostered
significant economic inefficiency. In most cities, redevelopment
subsidies have not been successful in overcoming the market
and the subsidies have been wasted.0 2 Where the market
favored office tower development-such as Boston, San Fran-
cisco, and Los Angeles--office towers were developed, but
redevelopment subsidies were not necessary for such develop-
ment to occur. Second, even though some individual projects
were successful, the economic development aspects of these
downtown projects did not benefit the broader economy.
In addition, even though nearly every major jurisdiction has
pursued corporate headquarters as part of redevelopment
strategies, over time the dispersal of corporate headquarters
remains limited. From 1969 to 1989, dispersal only increased
from eight to fourteen metropolitan areas containing fifty
percent of Fortune 500 companies.20 3 Some dispersal has
occurred. Yet, many metropolitan newcomers to the list, such
as San Jose,20 4 gained prominence because economic activity,
such as Silicon Valley growth, generated new additions to the
Fortune 500 list that had grown indigenously, independent of
redevelopment incentives.
Similarly, the effectiveness for the regional economy of a
strategy that pursues corporate headquarters and FIRE indus-
tries must be suspect. Logan and Molotch explain that from
1969 to 1979 the Northeast states "lost virtually none of their
dominance in industrial, banking, and insurance headquarter
200. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
201. See Peter Passell, The False Promise of Development by Casino, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 12, 1994, at F5.
202. Witness the downtowns of Fresno and Oakland, California, and innumerable
other cities that lack the locational cachet of cities such as Boston, San Francisco, and
Los Angeles.
203. Sally K. Ward, Trends in the Location of Corporate Headquarters, 1969-1989,
29 URB. AFF. Q. 468, 476 (1994).
204. Id.
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activities."" 5 Simultaneously these Northeastern cities became
synonymous with urban decline. Just as luring such headquar-
ters does not create a thriving city, maintaining such head-
quarters does not necessarily result in a healthy economy.
According to a report by a respected economic consulting firm,
in 1992, after years of extensive focus and subsidy for Los
Angeles' downtown, the FIRE industries located there account-
ed for only eight percent of Los Angeles' employment.20 6 Manu-
facturing, neglected and despised, continued to account for
twenty-four percent.20 7 Elites use redevelopment to plan and
locate ventures and employment that they deem important.
Rarely will this also benefit the low-income and disadvantaged.
Los Angeles' economy might be very different if redevelopment
effort and spending had focused on manufacturing rather than
on the FIRE industries.
In Boston a similar result is evident. After twenty-five years
of intense international competition, the shoe industries there
have been ravaged.20 8 Government has, in turn, focused on
high-tech economic development strategies in addition to down-
town office development.2 9 Yet, in 1993, the shoe industry ac-
counted for one-third more employment in the Boston area
than all high-tech industries combined.210 The industrial policy
pursued by redevelopment in both Boston and Los Angeles has
focused on downtown development and has not benefitted the
broader city.
2. Residents Are Not Clients-Standard explanations for
the crisis in urban central cores indicate that cities face a
fiscal crisis stemming from white flight to the suburbs, with
employment and retail opportunities following. From this
observation come several prescriptions. First, a fiscal crisis
requires a fiscal response: the city must increase its tax base
and lure private investment. Second, the city must either lure
in, or lure back, wealthy white residents.2 1' For example,
205. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 8, at 260.
206. ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES ET AL., A PROPOSAL FOR A REGIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE CITY OF Los ANGELES app. (1993) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
207. Id.
208. Mier, supra note 103, at 38.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 34.
211. Even given these explanations and observations, the prescription is absurd
in the redevelopment context because every single jurisdiction-including suburban
enclaves-was entitled to use the same "extraordinary" powers. Moreover, the gall
in promoting this blatantly racist policy prescription is astounding.
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redevelopment planning in Boston was designed to pursue
what are entirely typical goals: increase the tax base of the
city and lure back middle-class and wealthy whites.212 The
Boston Redevelopment Authority's 1965-1975 General Plan
for the City of Boston proclaimed the policy to be "increasing
the diversity of [Boston's population] so that it more nearly
reflects the composition of the Region's population as a whole.
This would, of course, entail a reversal of present trends
towards increasing proportions of low-income groups and non-
whites in the core City."213 Thus, in spite of nice sounding
bromides from city officials, 214 "the city wanted to plan with
like-minded people, mainly middle-class homeowners, while
planning displacement for low-income residents."2 15 None of
these standard prescriptions view the current resident as the
"client" of city redevelopment activity.
This failure is evident and grotesque. Yet, many believe
revitalizing the tax base and luring back white residents will
provide jobs for poor residents and enhance the city's fiscal
posture. Would this result not enable the city to provide
greater services to the poor?216 Following this straw argument,
redevelopment policies favor investments based on the assump-
tion-often untested and usually unproven-that investment
will lead to more jobs. For example, the "reduction of the job
problem to an investment problem was almost an article of
faith" at the 1983 Cities' Congress on Roads to Recovery.217 An
212. LANGLEY C. KEYES, JR., THE REHABILITATION PLANNING GAME: A STUDY IN THE
DIVERsITY OF NEIGHBORHOOD 30-31 (1969) (citing BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AuTH.,
1965-1975 GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CITY OF BOSTON AND THE REGIONAL CORE at vi-2 (1964).
213. Id. at 29-30.
214. Mayor John Collins explained that he hoped redevelopment would be a
product of "planning with people instead of planning for people." Id. at 30 (citing The
90 Million Dollar Development Program for Boston, reprinted from the CITY REC.,
Sept. 24, 1960, at 1, 2).
215. PETE MEDOFF & HOLLY SKIAR, Snm OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RiE OF AN URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD 18 (1994).
216. One obvious reason for the common shape of redevelopment projects is that
private market sponsors present compelling arguments of sustainable development.
This simple observation has significant repercussions. City governments cannot be
faulted for trying to attract large-scale producers ofjobs and tax revenue and making
them sustainable in the marketplace. A governmental income supplement to a disad-
vantaged person is not sustainable. The economy may cease to support that expendi-
ture, or more likely, political will may shift and the expenditure will be reduced or
removed as quickly as it was offered. To the extent that a government expenditure
can, instead, induce another party to hire an individual in a competitive job which
can be sustained in the market, the choice for government is clear-especially because
the latter choice is probably cheaper.
217. Mier, supra note 103, at 34.
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attendee of this congress complained that "most of the shared
success stories focused on capital investment, usually in real
estate, and assumed that jobs naturally follow from such
investment."218 In essence, will not redevelopment benefits
trickle down to the real parties in interest?
219
Little evidence supports the contention that this result is an
actual goal any longer, and even less indicates this goal has
been successfully achieved. The logic fails in both circum-
stances for the same reason. The connection between giving the
third party an initial outlay and the end result is too tenuous.
In this context it is trickle-down that fails. 220 That it fails so
obviously is further evidence that residents are not the clients
of current redevelopment. This trickle-down approach, and the
opportunity costs it imposes on low-income city residents,
deserves a detailed evaluation.
Trickle-down theory assumes that by helping directly al-
ready-wealthy person X we will in fact help disadvantaged
person Y in a more sustainable manner than by helping person
Y directly. 22' This theory is valid only to the extent the connec-
tions between the original outlay and the legitimating result
are strong.222
The fact that'poor urban residents are not the clients of
redevelopment-even in a trickle-down context-is underscored
by the actions jurisdictions have not taken. For example, many
current legal structures could either reduce the harm to the
poor from redevelopment or increase the benefit. Local
jurisdictions, however, rarely, if ever, pursue these efforts. If
agencies manage to pursue these efforts, they do so in a
haphazard and ineffective fashion.223 Concerned jurisdictions
218. Id. at 32-33 (noting that such fundamental failures of logic are commonplace
and indicate that residents are rarely the true "client" of development efforts).
219. In the past, this logic justified the original federal investment in urban
renewal, anticipating that a substantial up-front federal outlay would generate cities
that were sustainable because of population characteristics and revenue production
and would therefore cost the federal government less in the long run.
220. This passage assumes without discussion that there are some trickle-down
approaches that work.
221. See supra note 216.
222. For example, the job for person Y should be guaranteed up front or else the
claimed benefits of the trickle-down approach will not be realized. On the other side
of the coin, the efforts and the expenditure to person X must be calculated to do no
harm or at least do less harm to person Y than would result from doing nothing. Here
harm must include the opportunity costs of not making the direct outlay to person
Y or other reasonably likely uses of the tax revenue at issue.
223. For example, a recent employment linkage program conducted by the Commu-
nity Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles was summarized, "[elven in the guarded
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can fight housing displacement with community land trusts,
22 4
225 retclimited equity housing cooperatives, and rent control for
redevelopment project areas or nearby neighborhoods. 226 While
rent control is controversial, many of the legitimate concerns
about its use are obviated in the redevelopment context.227 This
is true because redevelopment project areas normally become
gentrifying markets. 228 A concerned jurisdiction could also step
up tax delinquency and housing code enforcement penalties to
take dilapidated apartment buildings and transfer them to
tenants at reduced cost and with subsidized loans for rehabili-
tation. Still more directly, a concerned jurisdiction could build
replacement housing before clearance and displacement takes
place.
To address negative effects on employment, local preference
hiring would be much more effective in assisting disadvan-
taged project area residents-for employment located by
words of individuals responsible for implementing portions of the linkage program...
[as] 'unsuccessful.'" Fred Seavey, L.A.'s Employment Linkage Program Offers Potential
Community Benefits, REDEVELOPMENT ADVOC., Winter 1993, at 4. This article further
explains that applicants referred by the agency after a rigorous screening process
"were selected to fill only eight of 243 positions during the first phase of the hiring
process!" Id.
224. For a discussion of community land trusts, see THE INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITY
ECONOMICS, THE COMMUNITY LAND TRUST HANDBOOK (1982).
225. See generally David H. Kirkpatrick, Cooperatives and Mutual Housing
Associations, ABA J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L., Spring 1992 (describ-
ing different kinds of cooperative and mutual housing association options).
226. Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing
Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835, 1855 (1988).
227. In a gentrifying market-which a redevelopment-altered neighborhood
inevitably becomes-for rent control to adequately protect existing low-income
residents it must include actual rent control, warrant of habitability protection,
eviction restrictions, a moratorium on condominium conversions, and residential
zoning restrictions to maintain residential uses for land. Id. at 1841.
Indeed, if government intervention and intrinsic imperfections in the housing
market impose costs such that the equilibrium rent is higher than in a perfectly
competitive market, by lowering economic rents the proposal [for rent control
in a gentrifying market], rather than causing people to waste space, may reduce
overcrowding and result in a more efficient allocation of space.
Id. at 1852.
Critics have attacked rent control housing policy, however, on economic grounds.
Their economic efficiency arguments do not provide a compelling basis for rejecting
rent control. Most of the economic criticisms are mistaken or are accurate only when
applied to rudimentary forms of rent control or to rent control in a non-gentrifying
market. Id. at 1855. For example, in gentrifying markets, rent control prevents high-
income consumers from outbidding low-income consumers, thereby keeping high-
income consumers out of the low-income market. Id. at 1848.
228. For a definition of gentrification, see supra note 157.
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redevelopment-than could comparable race-based mea-
sures.229 Outside of broad statutes a concerned agency could
mandate hiring of disadvantaged individuals through con-
tracts with subsidized developers and their tenants. Similar
preferences for local businesses also would be possible.
Finally, a concerned redevelopment agency-would actively
seek to address social service problems caused by its diversion
of tax increment funds. This concern might require dissolving
project areas in order to allow the tax revenue to revert back
to the sponsoring jurisdiction.23° Alternatively, this concern
could require portions of the tax increment funds that an
agency receives be used to subsidize social service providers.
Although redevelopment has been construed as tied strictly to
bricks and mortar development of buildings, such a construc-
tion is not necessary. If providing social services is necessary
to redress blight-the fundamental justification for all redevel-
opment powers 23 1-then such expenditures should be allowed.
232
Agencies have not pursued these issues with any vigor. When
one compares the creative legal interpretations agencies have
produced concerning relocation payments, and the creative
flair-indeed verve-agencies typically exhibit in finding blight,
or identifying an area as "predominantly residential" under the
federal programs, it is clear that when an agency wants to
pursue a goal, very little can stop it. The fact that agencies
generally have not pursued the simple goals set forth above
indicates that agencies do not care to achieve those beneficial
results.
229. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), effectively bars any meaningful
racial preferences by a local government under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
contrast, a local preference does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection concerns. Instead, local preferences implicate the Sixth Amendment's
privileges and immunities concerns. These concerns are far less fundamental and do
not trigger strict scrutiny as do race-based preferences. See, e.g., United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984) (implying that a well-tailored
ordinance which required contractors working on city projects to employ a minimum
percentage of city residents might not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause);
cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 214-15
(1983) (holding that a city expending funds under its control-in whole or in
part--on public construction projects is a market participant, and thus does not
violate the Commerce Clause when it requires all city-funded construction to be
performed by a workforce of at least half city residents).
230. See supra text accompanying note 70.
231. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes
77-82.
232. Each of these options has legal uncertainties and difficulties in the redevelop-
ment context: each would justify its own law review article.
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That the inner-city residents are not the clients of agency
redevelopment efforts represents an additional huge opportu-
nity cost of redevelopment as practiced currently. Redevelop-
ment as practiced currently pursues results that cannot be
expected to benefit inner-city residents in spite of claims
towards revitalizing the tax base or creating jobs. Plainly, if
redevelopment constituted projects designed to increase the
quality of life and the opportunity of inner-city residents, the
projects would be very different.
3. Unequal Risk and Reward-Finally, redevelopment, as
practiced under the federal regime and as practiced currently
under local efforts, will not benefit the urban poor because it
promotes and relies upon unfair distribution of risk.233 This
unfair distribution of risk under standard redevelopment
imposes additional opportunity costs on low-income city resi-
dents.
The risk and reward ratios of participants in redevelopment
are skewed on two axes. First, the distribution of risk and
reward between the jurisdiction and private developers is out
of alignment. This flows, in part, from the fiscal crisis view of
urban decline and the preferred response of giving private
investment advantages to encourage it to locate in certain
areas.
234
The second risk-reward disalignment stems from the fact
that the majority of social costs caused by redevelopment are
borne by the urban poor, often minorities. The poor face
233. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 157.
234. David Fasenfest, Community Politics and Urban Redevelopment: Poletown,
Detroit, and General Motors, 22 URB. AFF. Q. 101, 114 (1986). Fasenfest writes:
The only conditions under which the project made sense were that GM would
build its plant, have two shifts on line in the very near future, and backfill
operations at the Clark and Fisher plants. Yet nowhere in the process [did] the
city propose performance constraints to ensure net benefits before the project
[was] actually undertaken. The people of the city of Detroit assumed all the
expenses and took all the risks.
Id. at 114. Of course earlier decisions limited the parameters of"possible' actions for
future decisions. "The first issue, production decisions affecting the city as a whole,
was controlled solely by the internal accounting practices of GM. Clearly, . .. the
result of the first issue strategically placed constraints on, and limited, the range of
outcomes to subsequent issues." Id. at 115. "The subjective interests of the people of
Detroit centered on the idea that the city could not afford to lose the GM plant. While
this was in fact true, it also could not afford to embark on the particular path chosen
by the mayor and the [Community and Economic Development Department]." Id. at
119.
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unsought displacement and inadequate relocation. The poor
face the destruction of affordable housing units. The poor face
reduced job opportunities because many local small businesses
are displaced and closed by redevelopment. The poor watch
redevelopment create jobs they will never attain. The poor bear
the risk of misallocated tax dollars being squandered on
unnecessary subsidies for development. The poor suffer as
redevelopment is used to exclude them from suburban cities
and their schools and opportunities. Aside from inadequate
relocation payments which provide little assistance in a hous-
ing market with a chronic shortage of affordable units, the poor
receive no compensation whatsoever for the massive risks-and
true costs-the jurisdiction foists upon them.
There are two responses to these unfair allocations of risk:
(1) remove the risk or (2) reward the risk fairly.235 Risk is zero
sum in the redevelopment context--either the developer bears
the risk, the residents bear the risk, or the jurisdiction bears
the risk. Under the present regime, the residents bear the
brunt of the risk.236 Indeed, the rules of the game are so
skewed that frequently resident groups can merely ask for
mitigation of the bad effects of redevelopment. In turn, the
agency will generate only the revenue to support the mitigation
if the redevelopment project is succesful. This fact helps to
explain why the developer's success often becomes para-
mount--even to those people who oppose the project on the
whole.237 In other words, if the decision to remove an individ-
ual's home can be compensated fully,23 but the compensation
of replacement housing will only materialize as a result of
future tax-increment funds, then, because potential displacees
cannot stop the projects, they are subject to powerful incentives
to give developers everything they ask in order to improve the
development's chances of success.2 3
9
235. Via the Securities and Exchange Commission we have an entire federal
apparatus funded with tax dollars to protect the risk of those who invest in corporate
equities, yet we have no structures to protect economic actors who, voluntarily or
otherwise, assume significant "real" risk.
236. The jurisdiction's decision makers and staff bear risk but in a diffused and
relatively painless way. If development does not proceed, the funding was off-budget
and, given the general lack of accountability, no one in particular will suffer.
237. See infra note 239.
238. Such a decision would meet the "potential Pareto-optimality," or Kaldor-Hicks
measure of economic efficiency. This criterion is met if all parties support a decision
because those who benefit from a decision fully compensate those who suffer as a
result of the decision. See Michael Graetz, Legal Transition, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 47,
66-68 (1978) and authorities cited therein.
239. Similar examples of this scenario include the construction unions that support
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With every jurisdiction across the country pursuing the same
policies and competing for the same types of users of redevelop-
ment, it is inevitable that the risk of development will be borne
by the low-income residents. Bearing this risk generates a huge
burden for the low-income city residents. Resident-controlled
redevelopment would completely reverse this state of affairs.
By changing the rules of the game and giving project area
residents control over redevelopment, the risk and reward
structure would be radically revised.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Given the criticisms presented above and the apparently
hydraulic inevitability of the abuse that flows from the process,
one well might question whether the redevelopment "beast can
be tamed."24 ° Can the allure of the phenomenal powers that
redevelopment offers actually be harnessed to serve the low-
income communities where it is implemented and in whose
name the powers are justified? The answer is "yes, within
limits." This Article proposes a program for reform based on
any public works project that will create jobs for their membership regardless of the
harm the construction does to communities that share many interests with the union
membership and regardless of the waste of tax dollars involved.
Hartman recounts the tragic change of heart within organized labor in San
Francisco from strong concern over the types of redevelopment pursued to utter
capitulation. HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 65-66. Initially, labor argued against the
Yerba Buena project and its proposed creation of convention halls and sports arena
with the
"loss of millions of square feet of industrial space [that] can only extend unem-
ployment, suffering and poverty ....
In addition to the many workers who will lose their jobs, we wonder if the
policy makers of this City have thought of the social and economic effect on over
3,000 single persons, a third of them aged, who will be displaced in the area
without realistic provision for relocation ....
What [the Agency is] not obstructing are the special interests of certain
groups. The Agency and Mr. Herman must be reminded of their obligations to
the rest of the citizens of San Francisco. The Yerba Buena issue is a good place
to start."
Id. at 65-66 (quoting SAN FRANCIscO LABOR COUNCIL, Official Bulletin, Nov. 3, 1965).
Yet later, organized labor made the incredible statement that "We are in favor of
building with no respect to where it is and how it is." Id. at 66 (quoting Weinstein,
supra note 152, at 12). This is an example of one route to political and social oblivion.
240. I borrow this phrase from conversations with Mary Lee, an attorney with the
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.
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promoting resident-controlled redevelopment as the exclusive
means of conducting redevelopment.
This Article presents these recommendations-as opposed to
outright abolition of redevelopment-for two reasons. First,
taking into account the many criticisms just cited, redevelop-
ment is'a structure crying out for reform on moral and econom-
ic grounds. Yet, redevelopment has not disappeared. It is
unlikely.to die in any foreseeable time frame. If it will not die,
we must change it. Second, redevelopment could be a tool of
civic revitalization on many fronts. Reformed redevelopment
with residents in control will pursue different goals using
different processes. These goals and procedures could benefit
the fiscal posture of cities, the physical environment of cities,
the local economy, and the life chances of residents.
A. Resident-Controlled Redevelopment:
The Dudley Street Example
[Tihere must come a time in any community's life when
the interests of the total community must dominate those of
the neighborhoods. At such times, in my judgment, a [neigh-
borhood] veto is not in the interest ofhaving a desirable
community."'
No little popular group is going to put together a multi-
million dollar project. They aren't going to stop one either.242
-- Justin Herman
Time after time resident groups have proved the first of
Herman's predictions false. Only recently have local groups and
Community Development Corporations proved the second
prediction false as well.243
241. MOLLENKOPF, supra note 90, at 193 (quoting Justin Herman, Renewal Official
Responds, 36 J. HOUSING 602, 602 (1969)).
242. Id. (quoting Justin Herman in an interview, cited in Ann Bastian, The Politics
of Participation: A Case Study in Community Organization 83 (unpublished senior
honors thesis, Radcliffe College, 1970)).
243. Community development corporations (CDCs) have emerged over the last two
decades as vital local responses to economic decline. CDCs are the foot soldiers in the
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By far the best known example of resident-controlled rede-
velopment is the Dudley Street neighborhood in Boston.244
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) is the
first community-based organization to be granted some of
the powers traditionally reserved for redevelopment agen-
cies. DSNI has successfully used these powers along with
a comprehensive plan generated by community residents,
and adopted by the city, to take control of development in
their neighborhood. The project required community groups
with vision, a foundation that was willing to fund a risky
proposal, and the cooperation of city decision makers.245
By the middle of the 1980s, "disinvestment and a wave of
insurance-related arson left half of the land in Dudley Street's
residential areas ... idle and vacant."246
According to the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative
Revitalization Plan: A Comprehensive Community Con-
trolled Strategy, the area was also "ripe for the picking" to
real estate speculators, developers, and investors due to the
completion of a major mass transit project nearby, the
community economic development movement. The following is a brief bibliography
of important documents regarding community economic development:
BRAD J. CAFIEL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEV. & LAW CI., COUNSEILING ORGANIZATIONS IN
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1992); CORRECTIVE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF
AMERICA'S COMMUNIfY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS (Neal SR Peirce & Carol F. Steinbach
eds., 1987); FROM REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO URBAN
DISINVESTMENT (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1992); BENNETT HARRISON, URBAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: SUBURBANIZATION, MINORITY OPPORTUNITY, AND THE CONDITION OF THE
CENTRAL CITY (1974); NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEV. & LAW CTR., A LAWYER'S MANUAL ON
COMMUNiTY-BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1974, DAvED P. ROSEN, NAT. CTR. FOR POLICY
ALTERNATIVES, PUBLIC CAPITAL (Linda Tarr-Whelan & Robert Strumberg eds., 1988); AvIS
C. VIDAL, NEW SCH. FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY
OF URBAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS (1992); Ben Quinones, Serving the
Client in New Ways; Community Economic Development, CED on the Job, 1993
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 773; Bill Traynor, Community Development and Community
Organizing, SHELTERFORCE, MarJApr. 1993, at 4; Nicholas Lemann, The Myth of Commu-
nity Development, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 9, 1994, at 27.
244. The following discussion relies heavily on interviews with relevant actors in
the Spring of 1993 (see infra notes 248-250); see MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 215; D.
Malcolm Carson, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative: Positive Redevelopment,
Redevelopment Advoc., Spring 1993, at 1. The Medoff and Sklar book is an excellent
and thorough analysis of the many problems confronting a community-based organi-
zation attempting to take control of its development future.
245. Carson, supra note 244, at 1.
246. Id. at 1, 6.
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overall "hot" real estate market in Boston, the proximity of
the neighborhood to the booming downtown area, and the
large amount of vacant land.247
In 1984, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) had
recognized these circumstances as well and announced plans
for the redevelopment of neighboring Dudley Square. The
Dudley Street neighborhood feared the typical results of
redevelopment-gentrification and displacement. DSNI began
when the Riley Foundation met with La Allianza Hispana, a
local agency, to explore funding a community-based coalition
to prevent displacement and to revitalize the neighborhood.
According to Sue Beaton of DSNI, the Riley Foundation took
the position that "if the community was willing to work to-
ward a vision of life, they would be faithful,"2 4 a position to
which Riley remains committed. Beaton emphasizes that Riley
has been a "wonderful asset" because of its willingness to
"allow the community to craft its agenda and work towards
community control, while bringing much-needed resources to
the table."249 In addition, Riley actively sought city and other
foundation support.25 °
Initially, the model for DSNI was typical: social service
agencies acting as intermediaries between funders and area
residents. However, at a February 1985 community meeting,
residents of the neighborhood rejected the proposed structure
of the organization, and instituted a direct election system for
the organization's Board of Directors, allotting seats to African-
Americans, Latinos, Cape Verdeans, whites, and representa-
tives of non-profit agencies, CDCs, small businesses, and
religious organizations.251 A majority of the thirty-one seats
currently are held by neighborhood residents.252 From this
247. Id. at 6.
248. Telephone Interview with Sue Beaton, Deputy Director, DSNI (May 27,
1993) [hereinafter Beaton Interviewl (notes on file with the author).
249. Id.
250. Telephone Interview with Newell Flather, Administrator, Riley Foundation
(May 26, 1993) (notes on file with the author).
251. MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 215, at 52-56.
252. Id. The actual composition of the Board is as follows: 12 community members
from the core area equally divided between African-Americans, Cape Verdeans,
Latinos, and whites; 5 representatives of nonprofit agencies from the health and
human service fields; 2 representatives of community development corporations; two
representatives of small business from the core area; 2 representatives from the
broader business community; 2 representatives from the religious community in the
core area; 2 other members whose identity is determined based on skill or represen-
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point on, community organizing, participation, and control have
been the foundations on which DSNI's success has been built.
Sue Beaton points out that "good, old-fashioned organizing is
the backbone of DSNI; without that we would be nothing."253
1. Community Plan-With extensive involvement by the
community, DSNI formulated a comprehensive 200-page com-
munity development master plan that addressed land-use,
housing, economic development, and human services in the
neighborhood.254 Developing the master plan required meetings
between residents and subcommittees of the board, workshops
and working groups, knocking on doors, focus groups, commu-
nity-wide meetings, and organizing around concrete short-term
issues.
The plan was organized around three areas: housing, human
services, and economic development. In order to achieve their
objectives, DSNI outlined thirteen specific revitalization stra-
tegies, including:
*the development of 2000 units of affordable housing;
*the creation of an urban village with a commons providing
space for retail enterprises and recreation areas;
o the development of programs to stop the displacement, re-
orient the provision of social services, address drug and
crime problems, provide child care and create business
opportunities for entrepreneurs;
-the development of alternative financing methods;
*the mobilization of the neighborhood and strengthening
of racial, ethnic, and cultural identity and diversity;
*the creation of employment, training, and educational
opportunities for residents; and
*the development of neighborhood-based businesses.
tational needs; 2 representatives from nonprofit organizations from the secondary
area; 1 city official; and one state official. Id. at 58. See id. at 47-48 for a description
of secondary and core areas. The first community election of board members was held
April 27, 1985. Id. at 58-59.
253. Beaton Interview, supra note 248.
254. The plan, entitled the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative Revitalization
Plan: A Comprehensive Community Controlled Strategy, is on file with the author.
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In addition, DSNI achieved a unique accomplishment: their
community plan was adopted as the city's plan for the neigh-
borhood, and the BRA subsequently granted them the power
of eminent domain under Chapter 121A of Massachusetts
law.2 5 An agreement between the City of Boston and DSNI
defines the process by which eminent domain, as well as the
transfer of city-owned vacant land, will occur.256 Massachusetts
does not have a law authorizing the use of tax increment
financing, so the city could not transfer that power as well. As
a result of the planning process, however, the city donated
many parcels of city-owned land for DSNI's purposes. The
critical fact here is that these redevelopment powers are a tool
for achieving broader goals identified by residents.
2. Community Land Trust-Keeping with the resident-
controlled approach, one of the first DSNI projects was the
creation of a community land trust to fight gentrification and
displacement. The Plan provided that all of the land acquired
by DSNI was to go into a community land trust-a private,
non-profit corporation affiliated with, but legally distinct from
DSNI--called Dudley Neighbors Inc. (DNI).257 DNI will use
ninety-nine-year ground leases to make land available for the
construction of affordable housing, community facilities, and
open space. Under the ground lease, DNI will own the land and
the residents will own the buildings, either as individual or as
cooperative units. To keep the housing affordable, DNI re-
served the power to cancel the ground lease and force the
offending resident to leave his or her premises. The land trust
is governed by a locally-controlled board of directors, the
majority of whom are chosen by DSNI and accountable to its
members.
3. Financing-DSNI has thus far assembled over $50
million in financing commitments from a wide variety of
sources, including:
*a $2 million investment at 1% interest from the Ford
Foundation;
*a $1 million line of credit from the Consumers United
Insurance Corporation;
255. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 2 (1992).
256. MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 215, at 119. See id. at 121-44 for a description
of the process leading to DSNI's acquisition of this power.
257. See id. at 12-27, 158-59 for a description of DNI.
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9$1 million building loan from the City of Boston;
9$2.5 million from HUD for construction of low-income
housing;
9$15 million from Local 26 of the Hotel and Restaurant
Workers Union for development of low-income housing; and
*a portion of a $500 million commitment made by area
banks to the Community Investment Coalition (of which
DSNI is a member).258
On Saturday, March 20, 1993, DSNI held its first ground-
breaking ceremony for construction of thirty-eight affordable,
single-family homes. Other projects are nearing the construc-
tion phase. DSNI has now entered the period where. the long
years of organizing and planning will pay off in tangible
results.
DSNI represents a radical departure from conventional rede-
velopment models. Instead of powerful outside forces represent-
ing downtown elites forcing development on a neighborhood,
a community took control of its own future, created a common
vision, and assembled the tools to realize that vision. It is
important to note that redevelopment powers were but a few
of the many tools for revitalization DSNI marshalled together.
Other similar efforts-with varying degrees of outright resident
control-are underway elsewhere across the country.2 59
258. Carson, supra note 244, at 9.
259. Telephone Interview with Jeff Gibney, President, South Bend Heritage
Foundation (Mar. 28, 1994) (notes on file with the author). The South Bend Heritage
Foundation (SBHF), a community-based CDC with a board comprised half of
community residents and half of residents from the city at large, is pursuing a
redevelopment project in South Bend, Indiana, including significant affordable housing
development in a distressed neighborhood. Like DSNI, they have cobbled together
many funding sources to get their project off the ground. Also like DSNI, the city has
cooperated. JeffGibney, president of SBHF, attributes this cooperation to the fact that
the area was so controversial that the city would not have become involved without
community support, and to the fact that the city had tried other approaches and failed.
In 1993, the SBHF completed a strategic plan for a notorious existing business dis-
trict, hired consultants and a community organizer for the district, and decided to tear
the buildings down and build 29 duplexes and triplexes for rental. The project was
declared a redevelopment project area with SBHF providing staffsupport for planning
and neighborhood people implementing the plan. Id.
In addition, the author is assisting a community group in Los Angeles and the
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles in negotiating significant resident control of a
proposed redevelopment project area in South Central Los Angeles.
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B. Resident-Control Resolves Major Criticisms
Resident-controlled redevelopment would address all the
major criticisms of standard redevelopment set forth above.26 °
This is true for two reasons: (1) the client would be the neigh-
bor of the decision maker and have direct electoral control over
the decision maker regarding that single issue and (2) the
client and the decision maker would be the parties that would
directly and visibly bear the risk of mistakes and wasted
money.
1. Libertarian Critique-Resident-controlled redevelopment
responds to this criticism least well.26' However, on two counts
this proposal would be more acceptable to such critics than is
current practice. First, the resident board would be accountable
directly to project area residents through regular elections.
Second, given that local residents would be in control, it is
unlikely that eminent domain would be used to take property
with any frequency.262 In addition, though redevelopment
would continue to divert property taxes, two outcomes hopeful-
ly would result. First, only neighborhoods suffering from years
of neglect would be entitled to trap property taxes and exercise
these powers. Second, recognizing that tax increment financing
diverts property tax from necessary services, low-income com-
munities would be more motivated to pay off their projects and
return the tax revenue to the jurisdiction.
2. Market Liberal Critique-Resident-controlled redevelop-
ment responds to many of the market-liberal critiques as
presented by Malloy.2"' Regular elections of bodies responsible
only for redevelopment would provide strong accountability.
The governmental intrusion into the economy likely would be
more efficient-or more justifiable ifjust as inefficient-in this
context because resident-controlled redevelopment. would pur-
sue goals important to low-income residents whose needs and
concerns normally are not reflected in the market. Such goals
would either be inimical to downtown domination or would
260. See supra Part III.
261. See supra Part III.A.
262. For example, a locally elected official would be extremely unlikely to approve
a taking by eminent domain of their neighbor's home.
263. See supra Part III.B.
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require significant and tight linkages between any subsidies
for such development and benefits to local residents.
Strictly speaking, any subsidy for development will result in
inefficient development decisions compared to the mythical free
market. Resident-controlled redevelopment would serve to
locate and subsidize development and therefore also be ineffi-
cient. If redevelopment were limited to distressed central-city
neighborhoods, however, these inefficient decisions would be
limited to areas ignored or despised by the market. Resident-
controlled redevelopment would foster development that both
truly requires subsidy and benefits residents-thus, justifying
governmental intrusion on the market.
Finally, resident-controlled redevelopment would shift the
power balance. In this way it would be a tool for fighting
against the circular use of political power to reinforce power
gained in the market.
3. Left Critique-Resident-controlled redevelopment re-
sponds best to the many critiques levied from the left. 2"4
Resident-controlled redevelopment would not be likely to
pursue a variant of downtown development, and so the odds
of it channeling resources away from the poor toward the rich
would plummet. Instead of imposing a threat, redevelopment
would target resources and benefits to particularly disadvan-
taged communities. Displacement and relocation would be
considered very carefully by any entity that was elected solely
for the purpose of conducting redevelopment. Displacement
might still occur, but it is likely that resident-controlled
redevelopment would take the strategic steps necessary to
minimize harm to displacees. Likewise, affordable housing
development or rehabilitation would be a high priority of such
a process. Although redevelopment would remain geographical-
ly focused, one can hope that by striving to improve the quality
of life and opportunities available to low-income inner-city
residents, redevelopment could fight the concentration of
poverty. Of course, the possibility of false blight findings
remains. To the extent that chic suburbs or swank neighbor-
hoods within larger cities may abuse these powers, reform will
be compromised.
4. Opportunity Costs-Resident-controlled redevelopment
would greatly reduce the opportunity costs that standard
264. See supra Part III.C.
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redevelopment imposes on low-income residents.265 With
resident control, it is likely that redevelopment would pursue
projects designed to benefit low-income communities. Resident-
controlled redevelopment could not create the flawed industrial
policy that standard redevelopment has created. Moreover,
resident-controlled redevelopment would ensure that the low-
income residents of the project area would be the clients of the
activity, and therefore would reverse dramatically the risk and
reward ratios.
The needs and opportunities of inner-city neighborhoods
across the country are so diverse that no cookie-cutter ap-
proach could seriously hope to improve the situation. The
ability to respond to this diversity is the beauty of resident-
controlled redevelopment. The local residents of the project
area would pursue projects based on their specific situation
and the needs and opportunities they identify. Thus, this
reform would remove the opportunity costs of the present
flawed process because low-income residents would be the
clients of redevelopment efforts.
The risk and reward opportunity costs are more difficult to
judge. Development does require finance. In the present
scenario, those who control the finance are in the driver's seat.
While it is obvious that many inner-city neighborhoods would
pursue many different development alternatives if they were
in control, it is not clear that this necessarily would result in
the cessation of inter-jurisdictional competition for develop-
ment dollars. However, with increased diversity, competition
will diminish and the benefits derived by low-income residents
will increase greatly with resident-controlled redevelopment.
As fewer areas pursue the identical sorts of development, and
as chic suburbs are cut off from redevelopment subsidies, the
sway of present developers will decline.
C. Difficulties Raised by Resident Control
Resident-controlled redevelopment, as exemplified by the
Dudley Street Initiative and as set forth as an archetype in
this Article, directly addresses the criticisms levied against
redevelopment as it is usually, practiced. Nevertheless, resi-
265. See supra Part III.D.
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dent-controlled redevelopment raises other difficulties that are
not trivial. Although some of these concerns are common to
redevelopment in general, some gain special prominence in the
resident-controlled context. These difficulties are: (1) deter-
mining project area boundaries-and hence which residents
would have a controlling say in the redevelopment process;
(2) locating front-end funding for preplanning and organizing
efforts; (3) providing technical assistance to the resident
groups; and (4) arming resident groups with the skills to
negotiate with private development sponsors and the broader
capital markets. These concerns are highlighted, not because
a pat answer is forthcoming, but because based on experience
these concerns will be important limiting factors that must be
closely considered while pursuing resident-controlled redevelop-
ment. That we do not yet have complete answers to these ques-
tions does not mean these problems are insurmountable; it
simply means that additional effort will be required.
1. Determining Boundary Areas and Establishing Project
Areas-One must resist the facile notion that local control is
inevitably proper and always would serve the goals set forth
above. First, "local" can mean many different things. The
federal urban renewal programs required citizen participation,
but when downtown development was at issue, this frequently
resulted in "popular legitimation ... provided by 'citizen
boards,' . . . comprised of the business elite."2 66 Alternatively,
in the modern era of local redevelopment, exclusive and chic
suburban communities often cordoned off up to 100% of their
surface area into redevelopment project areas in order to trap
local property tax increment funds." 7 Further, the common
"not in my background" (NIMBY)268 reaction to affordable
housing and other uses also militates against a simple exalta-
tion of local control.
Redevelopment subsidies have been justified as a means of
enabling central urban cores to compete with suburban devel-269
opment. Yet, most state statutes do not limit which juris-
dictions can use this power. Commonly the statutory language
is as follows: "There is in each community a public body,
266. Fainstein & Fainstein, supra note 12, at 254.
267. See infra text accompanying note 273.
268. This phrase refers to activism many neighborhoods use to exclude "undesir-
able" projects (from prisons to homes for the developmentally disabled) from their
area.
269. See generally Abrams, supra note 83, at 558, 569-71 (describing the increases
in federal funding for redevelopment of non-residential areas and the plans of several
cities to revitalize their business districts).
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corporate and politic known as the redevelopment agency of the
community."2 7' Thus, every political jurisdiction which can find
blight can exercise the extraordinary powers of redevelopment.
Currently, of California's 528 incorporated cities and counties,
390, or almost seventy-five percent, have redevelopment agen-
cies.2 7 '
The diffusion of these "rare" powers is nothing new. 272 For
example, by 1964,
some 70 percent of the 800 cities carrying out 1600 feder-
ally-assisted urban renewal projects had populations of less
than 50,000. Politically, renewal must help suburbs as well
as central cities. Yet this policy strengthens the hand of
suburbs who want "Negro Removal" or who plan to main-
tain patterns of income segregation.273
If these special powers are justified to encourage revitalization
of inner cities that presumably need this extra power in order
to compete effectively with suburban development-already
subsidized by massive freeway expenditures and other federal
programs-it is foolish indeed to allow suburbs the same
power. To the extent redevelopment reform does not tightly
limit these powers to distressed central-core areas, the reform
presented here will be less effective.274
Yet, even where suburban jurisdictions would be barred from
redevelopment, difficulties arise in promoting resident-con-
trolled redevelopment. Within a jurisdiction many neighbor-
270. NEV. REV. STAT. § 279.426 (1991) (emphasis added).
271. Telephone Interview with Dwayne West, Policy Analyst, California League
of Cities (Aug. 10, 1994).
272. As of June 30, 1964, "743 localities (in 43 of the 50 states) [had] either
approved for execution or planning [redevelopment projects under the federal
program]." MESSNER, supra note 27, at 10. "Estimates for 1966 indicated that 888
localities" would initiate projects. Id. at 11. It is hard to imagine 888 of the densely
populated urban quarters one typically considers in terms of revitalizing the "city."
273. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 170.
274. According to a cost-benefit analysis of urban renewal in the suburban Long
Island community of Rockville Centre:
The decision to federally finance the renewal of Rockville Centre ... does not
seem to be entirely compatible with the goal of the Housing Act of 1949, which
was to restore cities, in part by making them more competitive with their
surrounding suburbs. In fact, the Rockville Centre project contributes, if, in a
very small way, to the centrifugal forces of urban development that the Urban
Renewal program was designed to offset.
WENDY FLEIScHEl, EVALUATING URBAN RENEWAL A CASE STUDY: RwE CENTRE, NEW
YORK 41 (Wharton Real Estate Ctr. Working Paper No. 86, 1991).
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hoods may want to use these powers. If they all pursued
redevelopment, would not general revenue decline? How and
who would choose between the competing neighborhoods?
There are two responses to these questions. First, this concern
may be overblown. Very few neighborhoods within a city could
meet the requirement of real blight,2 75 and also have the
organizing or development capacity necessary to first gain
majority acceptance of the proposal within that zone, and to
then implement the complex and time-consuming redevelop-
ment procedures. If, within given cities, many neighborhoods
have this capacity, then allocating discretion to local elected
officials would invite all the present abuses. The second
response is that there are any number of objective decision-
making schemes to resolve this problem, including: a lottery
within the jurisdiction, or a reverse "beauty contest" based on
need within the neighborhood determined by demographic and
other indices of crisis; the likely number of jobs for residents
per subsidy dollar; or the length of time that tax revenue would
need to be diverted to establish the project. Finally, however,
this problem may not be resolved in advance and must await
the given facts of actual situations.
2. Establishing Front-End Financing-Given the long-term
nature of planning and real estate development, other resident
groups who seek to replicate DSNI's efforts also must find a
consistent source of start-up and predevelopment funding.
DSNI was lucky in finding a stable and committed funding
source from a local foundation. This strategy should be repeat-
ed where possible. Foundations, however, are not the sole
possible source of such funding and cannot be the exclusive
source. Redevelopment agencies may well have adequate funds
to encourage such activity, because, after all, the community
will be doing the agency's job. The dilemma is to receive the
money without also being purchased by it. Mandating dispersal
of funds to various distressed neighborhoods could be a require-
ment of state enabling legislation so that local political discre-
tion and favoritism does not cloud the picture. Other funding
sources include federal grants or judgments resulting from
impact litigation. Finally, Community Reinvestment Act27
programs could generate this up-front financing to serve the
275. In this instance blight would be used as a rigorous screening device to target
the resources channeled by redevelopment to particularly deserving areas.
276. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988).
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broader purpose of community planning and development. In
any case, the residents must make a commitment to the
process and demonstrate flexibility and diligence in seeking
and mixing funding resources.
3. Gaining Technical Assistance-Redevelopment currently
requires technical assistance from legal, organizational, and
financial sources. These resources also would be critical to
resident-controlled redevelopment. With resident boards who
may be less sophisticated than local elected officials and staff,
it is reasonable to be concerned that resident decision makers
would have difficulty controlling technical consultants. The
process of residents gaining comfort with exercising control
over professionals will take time in each case, but there is
reason for optimism. As elected representatives, the resident
board would be accountable to the effort of ensuring that
benefits accrued to area residents. A growing industry of
nonprofit and community-based economic development consult-
ing entities continues to emerge. Hopefully, entities with a
philosophical commitment to neighborhood improvement would
provide the responsible services and deference that will enable
resident boards to control the process.
4. Negotiating with Private Capital-Resident ability to
negotiate with private capital is a fundamental concern. It is
possible that residents of distressed neighborhoods would be
in such extreme economic circumstances that private develop-
ers would control the process and exploit this advantage
against the residents of a project area. Competent technical
assistance to the resident boards would reduce this risk.
Alternatively, it is equally likely that a neighborhood with
nothing will have nothing to lose by patiently driving the
hardest bargain possible. Again, because the residents would
be the client of any subsidized development, one can hope that
the result would be dramatic improvement.
V. FOSTERING COMMUNITY-CONTROLLED REDEVELOPMENT
No magic bullets exist that will remove the local political and
bureaucratic realities that push jurisdictions towards redevel-
opment that hurts the resident poor while also harming
economic development within the jurisdiction. The criticisms
of standard redevelopment set forth above are responses to
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entrenched outlooks and positions that make the Maginot Line
look like a screen door. Imposing any significant reform on the
redevelopment process requires some maneuvering. Reform
likely could be implemented through three approaches: amend-
ing federal taxation codes, amending state enabling legislation,
and vigorous political action at the local level.
A. Federal Tax Code Revisions
As noted above, foregone federal tax revenues on tax-exempt
bonds subsidize redevelopment to a degree that probably
exceeds direct federal outlays under the earlier federal pro-
grams.277 To the extent that a jurisdiction hopes to utilize tax-
exempt bond financing, the jurisdiction is obliged to comply
with federal requirements. Although Congress revised the tax
code significantly in 1986, they did not include a provision
requiring resident control of redevelopment project areas as a
condition to the right to issue tax-exempt bonds.
The world of tax-exempt bonds is particularly complex and
this Article will not delve too deeply into it. Relatively simple
modifications of the Internal Revenue Code, however, could
generate strong inducements for the creation of resident-
controlled redevelopment. The effect would be doubly salutary
in that the traditional lack of state resources to oversee* rede-
velopment could be compensated, to a certain extent, by the
efforts of counsel for bond underwriters as a part of their due
diligence work.
Generally speaking, the interest income from state or local
bonds is not taxable unless the bond is a "private activity bond
which is not a qualified bond."2 7' Therefore, the Internal
Revenue Code allows for two sorts of tax-exempt bonds to be
issued by local jurisdictions: first, a bond that is not a private
activity bond2 79 and second, a bond that is a private activity
277. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69 for an explanation of federal
subsidies through tax-exempt bonds.
278. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a)-(b) (1988).
279. A private activity bond is one from which more than 10% of the proceeds are
to be used for private business purposes and where more than 10% of the principal
or interest is secured by property used for private business purposes or by related
payments. A bond is also a private activity bond if the proceeds used to finance loans
to persons other than government units exceeds the lesser of five percent of the total
proceeds or $5 million. 26 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1988).
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bond but which is also a qualified bond.28 ° It would be a rela-
tively simple step to require a showing that the residents in
the zone have controlled the redevelopment project before
allowing the jurisdiction the privilege of issuing any non-
private activity bonds or any private activity bonds which are
also qualified bonds and therefore tax-exempt. This control
could be demonstrated by the creation of an elected decision-
making body, at least two-thirds of which is comprised of
residents of the project area and by petitions signed by, for
example, sixty percent of the residents of the project area
stating that they desire a redevelopment project in the pro-
posed location. The members of this body would be selected by
regularly staggered elections.
B. State Enabling Legislation
As noted above, redevelopment has been below the radar
screen for the past two decades in part because a single federal
legislative program no longer exists to provide a clear target
for criticism. 28' Rather, local jurisdictions pursue their redevel-
opment pursuant to individual state enabling legislation. A
model state enabling statute that (1) limits redevelopment
powers to significantly distressed cities and (2) requires
resident control of the redevelopment process could be one
method for implementing resident-controlled redevelopment on
a state-by-state basis.'In addition, comparison of diverse state
legislation with a single model statute will enable more focused
criticism on the state level. Finally, drawing attention to
current examples and conducting pilot projects would reduce
resistance to enacting this type of reform. California, for
example, has a statute that includes measures similar in many
ways to those recommended here.282 Obviously, the political
terrain that must be covered to create such amendments would
be fraught with peril. It is equally obvious, however, that
280. Section 141 defines qualified bonds as certain kinds of private activity bonds,
further subjected to the volume cap provisions of § 146 and the various limitations
of § 147. 26 U.S.C. § 141(c) (1988).
281. See supra Part II.A.
282. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33700-33738 (1968). Unfortunately, this statute
is discretionary rather than mandatory and does not appear to ever have been used.
The author is pursuing the possibility of generating pilot projects within California
to demonstrate the feasibility of operating under this statutory provision.
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current practice simply is not getting the job done. Experi-mentation is needed.
C. Local' Political Action
Ultimately, the approach most likely to be successful is local
political action. For states that allow a redevelopment corpora-
tion to pursue redevelopment, local CDCs should replace local
redevelopment agencies and take the lead in redevelopment
themselves. Where redevelopment authority lies only in legisla-
tive bodies or other municipal entities, groups must demand
that these bodies delegate their authority to a locally elected
board with decision-making authority in order to obtain
control. The DSNI story discussed above283 indicates that this
approach only may be possible if the city in question has given
up a business-as-usual approach to revitalization. Unfortunate-
ly, once powerful development groups have identified a particu-
lar area as ripe for development, a local government is not
likely to grant control to residents unless the neighborhood
already has proven itself capable of blocking development it
does not want. This power only can come from forceful local
political action.
VI. IMAGINING RESIDENT-CONTROLLED REDEVELOPMENT
Redevelopment conceived, planned, implemented, and con-
trolled by the residents of the affected project area is almost
impossible to imagine in the present climate of redevelopment
practice and local political realities. Yet, a handful of positive
examples do exist. Because these waters are largely untested,
advocates who espouse resident-controlled redevelopment often
are reduced to claiming that theory and limited practice
indicate the new approach will achieve different and better
results.2"4 Fortunately, every reason exists to believe that
conclusion to be true.
283. See supra Part IVA.
284. Obviously, it is likely that abuses and distortions would occur even in resi-
dent-controlled redevelopment. See Amitai Etzioni, Incorrigible, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July
1994, at 14, 16. Such problems should be viewed as a given in any social program. The
more appropriate questions are: will these abuses be rare and random, and will the
broader positive results overshadow any bad specific projects? Standard redevelopment
fails both prongs of this test.
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The Dudley Street example is informative and inspiring.
Nevertheless, it is plain that the variety of approaches, inves-
tigations, and goals necessary to revitalize the quality of life
in diverse central cities requires much more experimentation.
What would resident-controlled redevelopment look like if
created on a wide scale? First, it would be significantly more
diverse than standard redevelopment's pursuit of downtown
development. Distressed neighborhoods in cities simply do not
experience uniform problems that can be treated in a cookie
cutter fashion. Present standard-issue redevelopment-induced
"revitalization" of downtown areas is a distressingly similar
exercise across the nation. Yet, dealing with massive over-
crowding in one city will require entirely different strategies
than dealing with divestment and abandonment in other cities.
The following are some suggested avenues that resident-
controlled redevelopment may pursue, which would do more to
improve the economies and quality of life of central cities than
forty-five years of standard redevelopment has been able to
accomplish.
A. Bring the Suburbs Home
For communities such as Camden, New Jersey, which have
suffered from massive disinvestment and abandonment,
resident-controlled redevelopment could pursue strategies that
would create zones that are more like suburban cities. Open
space is in abundance, as are foreclosed buildings that the city
now owns. Assuming that bourgeois tastes and aspirations
apply to low-income people, why could not every current
household enjoy a spacious unit with a large lot?
B. Blue-Collar-Based Redevelopment
Communities are low-income because, inter alia, residents
lack access to decent jobs. Standard redevelopment has pur-
sued development that locates-but does not create-jobs for
wealthy, educated suburbanites. Resident-controlled redevel-
opment may pursue development that attracts manufacturing
jobs. More importantly, resident-controlled redevelopment
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boards would quickly realize that simply relocating jobs is not
enough, and that their powers need to be marshalled to help
create new, and protect existing, enterprises. Once given
decision-making authority, these neighborhoods also would
realize that their futures are tied to an international economy.
They might well strive to create an industrial-based redevelop-
ment approach which will serve them for the next thirty years.
C. Green Redevelopment
Many enterprises in low-income communities create toxic and
other hazardous byproducts. Yet, many also provide employ-
ment for nearby residents. Neither closing the facility nor
living with the waste are acceptable alternatives.2"5 Redevelop-
ment could be used to subsidize equipment and facilities that
would dramatically reduce environmental emissions. It is too
early to tell what this sort of development might look like. It
is plain, however, that redevelopment controlled by the resi-
dents would focus on merging employment and competitiveness
concerns with environmental concerns. Naturally, such an
employment focus should seek out-and utilize local preference
and first-source hiring policies to the maximum extent possi-
ble. 28 6
D. Mini-Redevelopment
In addition to looking outward to the national and interna-
tional economies and preparing for regional competitiveness,
resident-controlled redevelopment also could look inward to the
neighborhoods degraded by crime and environmental hazards.
For example, mini-redevelopment could use eminent domain
to take abandoned drug houses and give them to low-income,
stable families. Likewise, many neighborhoods are tarnished
by toxic pollution and other environmental problems. These
result in unsafe living conditions and also bar productive
285. See Rachel D. Godail & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees, and Autonomy: The
Convergence of the Environmental Justice Movement and Community Economic
Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IsSUES 25, 26-29 (1994).
286. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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investment. Mini-redevelopment could focus on environmental
remediation of such sites.
Typical redevelopment project areas are large and rarely
contain less than fifty acres of real estate. Mini-redevelopment
would focus on much smaller territories. Addressing eight or
ten properties in a four or five block area could quickly and
inexpensively transform the physical environment of a neigh-
borhood. Obviously, key difficulties in mini-development would
be overcoming the transaction costs of establishing small
project areas and the complications of issuing bonds on such
a small amount of territory. The virtues, however, are equally
obvious.
These general suggestions for new directions are by no
means exclusive. Many of the problems central-city, low-income
neighborhoods face, such as crime, drugs, inadequate housing,
and unemployment, transcend boundaries. Yet, the diverse
nature of low-income neighborhoods in central cities, their
different populations, local assets, indigenous leadership, and
ethnic compositions all indicate that resident-controlled rede-
velopment could pursue a diverse array of development oppor-
tunities and approaches.28 7 Recognition of this diversity reveals
the greatest opportunity cost of standard redevelopment to
date: we have wasted forty-five years pursuing projects with
no likelihood of benefiting the urban poor, and have lost forty-
five years' worth of experimentation which could have produced
a cornucopia of successful development approaches created by
a resident-controlled redevelopment process.
CONCLUSION
Redevelopment reform must, of course, fix the problems
associated with past failings: waste of tax dollars, lack of
accountability, displacement, misallocated subsidies, inefficient
development and finance decisions, and poor development
strategies of no benefit to the urban poor. It must also move
beyond merely arresting gross failures. It is the author's hope
that reformed redevelopment will pursue development that is
designed to benefit the low-income urban core residents and
287. These include some that are coopted, fail, or do more harm than good overall:
these outcomes would be a small price to pay for the benefits. See supra note 284.
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improve their life choices. Because resident-controlled redevel-
opment will put residents in control of the process, they will
be the clients it serves. This process will shift the risk alloca-
tion and reduce the negative externalities associated with
current practice. In short, the negative by-products of current
redevelopment efforts are not merely problems to be solved by
tinkering at the edges of the process. Rather, the byproducts
are symptomatic of the fact that the current process is con-
trolled by the wrong parties, pursues the wrong goals, and
serves the wrong people. Resident control will reverse this
scenario, and through real experimentation across diverse
cities, generate urban development approaches that can help
revitalize our urban cores.
